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ABSTRACT
The citizen legislator is both a controversial and recurring phenomenon of interest in
political science research. A longstanding concern for the discipline has been whether or
not involvement of the public in the lawmaking process is an asset or a liability to quality
governance. This study explores the desirability of citizen legislating in the American
states. A four dimensional index is created that includes empirical indicators of
“substantive” and “procedural” governance. These indicators include voter turnout, fiscal
health, the ideological distance between government and the citizenry, and the diversity
of a state’s interest group system. The total number of initiatives and popular
referendums that appear biennially within each of the fifty states is employed as the key
explanatory variable to capture the degree of citizen legislating that is occurring in the
states between 1980 and 2000. A random-effects generalized least squares regression
reveals that higher ballot measure counts are statistically and substantively associated
with better quality governance, indicating that citizen legislation is a quality input into the
political system. Key control variables such as divided government, interparty
competition, citizen ideological extremism, state legislative term limits, and legislative
professionalism also tell particularly poignant stories about the road to good governance.
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“It is the power of the public which bears the name sovereignty, and sovereignty cannot
be alienated. Legislative power belongs to the people, and can only belong to it alone.
Be yourselves the authors of laws which are to fashion your happiness!”
- Jean Jacques Rousseau, On Social Contract

I. INTRODUCTION
Who should govern? The issue of rule has found its way into the core of ancient
as well as modern political theory in addition to the frequent spotlight it is afforded in
contemporary research. Implicit in the question of who governs is the sought after end
game: Good governance. Good governance is not immediately definable. Rather, for the
purpose of analysis, it may be more readily identifiable by its symptoms than its
theoretical essence. Governance itself is a process, not a simple policy output that is
readily quantified. Political theory, however, instructs that the system of governance will
fall under two dimensions. These dimensions give rise to empirical indicators.
Specifically, a synthesis of ancient and modern conceptions of good governance
necessitates both “substance” and “procedure” (Rousseau [1762] 1988; Plato [360
B.C.E.] 1997; Habermas 1998; Dahl 2005; Rawls 2005). The “substantive” component of
good governance includes tangible policy or electoral outcomes and is the focal point of
Plato ([360 B.C.E.] 1997) and John Rawls (2005). Through the state of a union (its
policies and their consequences), one is afforded a look at the substance of governance.
In contrast, the “procedural” aspect asserts that governance is made good through the
process of citizen inclusion (Rousseau [1762] 1988; Habermas 1998). That is, efficacy
and inclusive participation lend legitimacy and thus goodness to the state of governance
Through the degree of political inclusiveness that is granted to a citizenry we are offered
a glance into the procedural component.
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As the question of governance is ultimately a question of rule, the succeeding
inquiry is: Under whose rule can good governance best be attained? The roles of the
executive as enforcer and judiciary as arbitrator have achieved near unanimous
agreement in contemporary political thought (Rousseau [1762] 1988; Habermas 1998;
Rawls 2005). The role of the legislative branch, whose duties are most closely associated
with active rule, remains in question.
There are two theoretical ideal-types offered as the “best” means of attaining
quality legislation, and by extension good governance: 1) legislation by knowledgeable
elites (Plato [360 B.C.E.] 1997; Burke [1770] 1999) or 2) citizen legislators (Rousseau
[1762] 1988). Because the fusion of ancient and modern conceptions of proper
governance necessitates the attainment of both substance and procedure, legislation by
knowledgeable elites loses initial credibility; as it ranks demonstrably lower on the
procedural component of good governance. This is due to less immediate public
inclusiveness in the legislative process.
In contrast, citizen legislating is the very definition of legislative inclusiveness.
Thus citizen legislating helps to beget the procedural component of good governance.
Conflicting evidence abounds, however, as to whether citizen rule is associated with
positive or beneficial “substance” (Bone and Benedict 1975; Lascher, Hagan, and
Rochlin 1996; Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Camobreco 1998; Tolbert 1998; Campbell
2001; Tolbert et al. 2003; Matsusaka 2008). In fact, this is among the most prevalent
criticisms of citizen legislating. It is argued that the public is, on average, ill informed and
unprepared to make good public policy choices (Cupps 1977; Plato [360 B.C.E.] 1997;
Cronin 1989; Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Ellis 2001). Consequently, this study aims to
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explore a longstanding quandary: What relationship exists between citizen legislating and
good governance?
Beyond the obvious theoretical considerations, investigating the effects of citizen
initiated legislation is of central importance to contemporary political science. Over the
years, numerous studies have questioned the importance of, and identified the lack of,
citizen education and citizen political knowledge (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Rosenstone
and Hansen 2003). More specifically, how much education and knowledge is necessary
in order to “vote correctly” (Lau and Redlawsk 1997)? Scholars have investigated which
background characteristics make people more or less likely to vote or demonstrate high
levels of political understanding (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Rosenstone and
Hansen 2003). Some have gone so far as to try and predict what a “fully informed voter”
might look like in terms of preferred policy choices (Althaus 1998). Furthermore,
research has explored the differences between “easy” and “hard” issue voters and the
respective implications for elections and policy outcomes (Carmines and Stimson 1980).
On some level, these inquiries are questions over the proper role that the citizenry
should play in order to attain a better governing process. That is, even among much of the
literature that appears to be unrelated to the question of “who should govern,” there is an
implicit consideration of citizen participation and the relationship it has with quality
governance. The notion of good governance is a near-universal and international concern,
as evidenced by the recent efforts of the World Bank to quantify the construct; primarily
as an informational beacon for international relations and business transactions. 1

1

Notably, the World Bank also adheres to the theoretical conception of governance as being both
substantive and procedural. Through survey data, it employs estimates of the “soundness” of a country’s
policies (substantive) and the means by which elected officials enter into and exit from office (procedural).
However, it is important to note that the World Bank’s Governance index is not particularly appropriate in
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The question arises; how best to operationalize citizen legislating? In the 50
American states, citizens legislate through the initiative and popular referendum. In their
most common form, initiatives are citizen-proposed amendments to a state constitution.
However, the initiative process may also be used to propose new statutes. In essence,
initiatives are ballot measures that propose entirely new pieces of law and fall outside of
the traditional legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government (Initiative and
Referendum Institute 2007). A popular referendum, on the other hand, refers to the means
by which citizens may propose amendments to or reject an existing statute within a state
(Zimmerman 2001). 2
A third form of citizen political involvement come in the form of the legislative
amendment. Legislative amendments are allowed in all 50 states and allow a state’s
legislature to propose constitutional or statutory reform that is placed before voters on a
statewide ballot in much the same manner as initiatives. This third type of citizen
involvement, however, is a type of direct legislation that is not initiated by citizens and
consequently it is not citizen legislating in the strictest sense. Political elites may employ
this process to create a façade of citizen involvement when the true goal may be to use
direct legislation as a means of passing the buck onto the public for potentially risky
public policy decisions that they themselves fear being held accountable for (Gross
2004). Alternatively, legislators may only propose amendments that have enough support

the study of direct legislation. First, even from a comparative perspective, direct legislation is primarily a
sub-national phenomenon. World Bank index values vary only by country. Thus, many influences of
citizen legislation would be lost, and the levels of analysis mismatched. Second, World Bank data does not
begin until 1996. Much of the good that can be garnered from a time-series analysis is lost. For these
reasons, I develop a wholly new measure of quality governance, one that is more suited to the study of
direct legislation. World Bank Governance data is available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,menuPK:232599~pagePK:64133170~piPK:64133498~theSitePK:239419,00.htm.
2

See John Zimmerman (2001) for a detailed account of how the contemporary popular referendum evolved
from a more primitive town-hall based protest vote against extant legislative statutes.
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in the public to pass, essentially reducing the process to a means of legitimizing a policy
platform (Gerber et al. 2001; Gross 2004). Hence the legislative amendment should not
necessarily be categorized with the other more purist forms of citizen legislative
involvement. The focus should be on citizen initiated legislation, and in the end, only
initiatives and popular referendums that reach a statewide ballot will be included in the
empirical component of this analysis. Arguably, such measures are proffered by
sufficient public support in the meeting of ballot access signature requirements and may
wield agenda-setting influence regardless of passage rates (Gerber 1999). 3
There is a near perfect split in the number of American states which allow some
combination of the initiative and popular referendum; effectively serving as an innate
comparative laboratory. Moreover, the 27 states that allow citizen initiated legislation
vary extensively in their use of these forms of direct democracy. Figure 1 demonstrates
this variation, which is credited to a number of institutional factors including the required
signature thresholds for ballot access, single-subject rules, as well as caps placed on the
number of initiatives and referendums that can appear on a ballot each year.

3

Elisabath Gerber (1999) calls this potential power of agenda-setting the “threat of initiative”.
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Figure 1: Total Initiative and Popular Referendum Use by State

Ultimately, the influences of citizen legislating will be evaluated against four
indicators; each pointing to some part of contemporary good governance. The key
explanatory variable will be a state’s biennial ballot measure count. With this measure of
citizen legislating in hand, this study sets out to investigate the relationship between
direct democracy and indicators of substantive and procedural good governance. The
indicators include; 1) voter turnout measured as the percent of a state’s voting-eligible
population that turns out to vote (see McDonald and Popkin 2001); 2) state fiscal health
measures as the level of a state’s annual year-end reserves (see Eckl 2007; Initiative and
Referendum Institute 2007); 3) greater diversity in interest representation approximated
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by the percent of total registered interest groups within each state that can be classified as
citizen groups (see Gray and Lowery 1996; Boehmke 2005a); 4) and last, the ideological
distance between the government and its electorate (see Berry et al. 1998) with lower
values indicating better quality governance. In the end, these four measures are combined
to form the State Good Governance Index (SGGI). 4
In accordance with systems theory, citizen legislation serves as one of many
potential inputs that enter the political system. Subsequently, the system engenders both
institutional and policy outputs which influence the political environment; the
environment cyclically proceeds to mold a new slate of inputs (Easton 1971). The
question at hand becomes does citizen legislation serves as a “quality demand” (Easton
1971). That is, does direct democracy play a noticeable role in the big picture of quality
“substantive” and “procedural” governance? Moreover, what are some of the tangible
implications of demos kratos? And broadly, what does this mean for good governance?
Building on existing literature, and employing this study’s findings in further inquiry, it
may become possible to systematically develop answers to longstanding questions
concerning the desirability of citizen legislating.

4

The methodology underlying the SGGI is detailed in the Research Design.

7

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Extant research suggests that citizen legislation has noticeable effects on both the
state and society (Matsusaka 1995; Camobreco 1998; Gerber 1996a; 1996b; 1999;
Braunstein 2004; Boehmke 2005a). 5 The literature covers a myriad of research questions
spanning from the influence of ballot measures on voter turnout (Smith 2001) and citizen
political knowledge (Smith 2002; Smith and Tolbert 2007; 2006; 2004) to its impact
upon state budgets (Cronin 1989; Matsusaka 1992; 1995; 2008; Clingermayer and Wood
1995; Thatcher 2008) and government responsiveness to public opinion (Gerber 1996b;
Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001). The norm is to examine citizen legislating
piecemeal, testing its influence on specific topics such as state spending, voter turnout,
citizen political efficacy, and the likelihood of certain public policies, such as Indian
gaming laws, being implemented within the states. Given the sheer volume of research
on citizen legislation it is not difficult to encounter contradictory findings. 6 Indeed,
conflicting evidence pervades on the fundamental issue of the desirability of citizen
legislating. Most importantly, for this research, there has been little success settling this
debate. Nor, is there a concerted effort to tie direct legislation to a holistic theoretical
construct such as good governance.
Prior work has varied in its conceptualization of direct legislation (see Banducci
1998; Gerber 1999; Boehmke 2002; 2005a; 2005b). Most frequently, scholars have
investigated its effects as a specific institutional arrangement that exists in some of the

5

For the purposes of this study, the terms “direct legislation” and “citizen legislation” will be used
interchangeably. Additionally, each term references the citizen initiative or popular referendum in the 50
American states unless otherwise noted.
6
For an example of such contradictory findings, see the sub-topic literature concerning the relationship
between direct legislation and government responsiveness to public opinion (Matsusaka 1992; 1995;
Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001).
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American states but not in others. The institutional consideration is usually
operationalized as a dichotomous variable, which denotes whether or not the initiative
process is available in a state (Tatalovich 1995; Donovan and Bowler 1998a; Schildkraut
2001; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004; Boehmke 2005a). Moreover, a majority of studies have
limited the operational scope of citizen legislating to include only initiatives (Gerber
1996b; Banducci 1998; Cain and Miller 2001; Boehmke et al. 2006); at the expense of
popular referendums which are an alternative form of citizen policy making (Initiative
and Referendum Institute 2008). 7
Studies to date that have investigated citizen legislating cluster under two general
theoretical orientations. First, there are inquiries which question the legitimacy of direct
legislation from the vantage points of a resource bias (where the campaign that expends
the most resources wins the ballot race) 8 , democratic norms (such as deliberation and
accountability), 9 and the public’s ability or competency to make public policy
decisions. 10 In the second instance, scholars have focused on discerning the tangible
influences of the initiative process on the citizenry (Smith 2001a; 2002; Alexander 2002;
Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003; Braunstein 2004; Boehmke 2005a; 2005b),
government (Matsusaka 1995; Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Donovan and Bowler
1998b; Garrett 1999; Gerber 1999; 2001; Alexander 2002), and public policy (Bone and
Benedict 1975; Tatalovich 1995; Cain and Miller 2001; Schildkraut 2001; Boehmke and
Witmer 2004; Matsusaka 2005; 2008); that is, what are its observable accomplishments
7

Of the 27 states that allow some form of direct legislation, only two (Florida and Mississippi) do not
currently have the popular referendum process available.
8
Cupps 1977; Cronin 1989; Schmidt 1989; Hadwiger 1992; Gerber 1999; Alexander 2002; Ellis 2002;
Braunstein 2004; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004.
9
Jones 1938; Magelby 1984; Warren 1993; Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Ellis 2001, 133, Gerber et al.
2001; Natelson 2001; Smith 2002.
10
Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Lupia 2001; Lupia and Johnston
2001; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004.
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within the context of government and society? Many of these research questions are
predated by studies which question the fundamental worth of citizen legislating.

The Legitimacy of Direct Legislation
The legitimacy of citizen legislating have been questioned because of an alleged
“resource bias” (Gerber 1999, Ch. 1). The resource bias suggests that money plays a
prominent role in determining which ballot measures pass and are thus implemented as
public policies (Owens and Wade 1986; Hadwiger 1992; Gerber 1999; Nicholson 2003).
Specifically, the resource bias holds that due to the dearth of citizen political knowledge,
initiative votes can be bought (Camobreco 1998; Cain and Miller 2001; Ellis 2002). All
measures must have a sponsoring committee or group (Braunstein 2004), and the
resource bias argues that the side which expends the most resources, primarily money,
will win the ballot measure campaign (Gerber 1999, Ch. 1; Alexander 2002). At its core,
the resource bias is rooted in the Populist Paradox which references the recurring concern
that direct legislation is controlled by deep-pocketed special interests (Gerber 1999). 11
Ultimately, the theory is rooted in fundamental suspicion of the citizen legislator, positing
that both ballot access and electoral success can be bought through advertisement and
attractive ballot measure titling (Price 1975; Lund 1998; Ellis 2001, 150)
This purported bias has served as the primary foundation for critics of direct
democracy in the states who assert that citizen legislation, by its very nature, cannot work
in the interests of good governance. The resource bias offers a potentially fatal blow to

11

This is noted as a paradox given the history of ballot measures in the states; they have traditionally been
credited as a “progressive” phenomenon that emerged as a public reaction to the perceived infiltration of
state governments by exclusive economic groups in the early 1900’s (Schmidt 1989; Alexander 2002;
Braunstein 2004).
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advocates of the citizen legislator. If votes and thus policy outcomes are bought and sold
to the highest bidder, this bodes ill for quality governance. At its core, the theory asserts
that the legitimacy of citizen legislating is compromised by special interests.
Investigations of the resource bias are rooted in case studies of salient initiatives
in states that have historically kept quality financial records. Within such works, a
number of observed ballot measure campaigns have been won by the side that expended
the most resources, specifically the most money (Cronin 1989, 215). However, a
methodological criticism should be noted. There are likely significant unit effects present
that go uncorrected by the very nature of these research designs. States such as Colorado
and California are noted for detailed financial record keeping, over a considerable length
of time, for ballot measure campaigns. Thus, these cases are the ones employed to test the
resource bias. However, states which employ sufficient financial record keeping are
likely to differ significantly from those states that keep less fastidious records. Moreover,
initiatives featured in case studies also tend to be highly salient (Gerber et al. 2001; Ellis
2001; 2002) and there is little reason to believe that the most salient initiative cases are
representative of all direct legislation. Consequently, the generalizability of such case
study driven conclusions is limited. 12
Furthermore, researchers examine polling results from both the General Social
Survey (GSS) and the American National Elections Studies (ANES) to gauge public
sentiment on specific ballot measures and direct democracy, more generally. Ellis (2002)
finds that while the public consistently expresses skepticism towards the government and
12

In a study of the initiative and referendum laws in the states, Richard Ellis (2002) reports a fundraising
“asymmetry” between candidate campaigns and ballot measure drives (45). While stringent financial
reporting laws currently limit the amount of money legally donated to political candidates, there are
virtually no such caps on what individuals or interested groups may donate to an initiative or referendum
committee (Ellis 2002, 44-7).
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politicians, the same distrust is not applied to the “will of the people” (125). Citizen
initiatives and popular referendums are viewed as an extension of the public’s political
acumen (Ellis 2002, 125). Subsequently, the electorate may not approach ballot measures
with the same discrimination reserved for government sponsored legislation or political
candidates (124-5). Conceivably, this may exacerbate the problem of the resource bias. If
the public does in fact approach direct legislation with less caution and less suspicion,
this may further public susceptibility to advertising, manipulative initiative or referendum
titling, and attractive summaries that appear on the ballot (Gerber 1999; Ellis 2002).
Attempts to discredit the resource bias have centered on falsifying its primary
tenet; that deep-pocketed economic interests have captured the process. Research,
however, has found that citizen groups have historically had better luck in placing
initiatives on the ballot than have economic groups. Moreover, citizen groups are also
more successful in passing their sponsored ballot measures (Gerber 1996a; Gerber 1999;
Braunstein 2004). 13 This has been credited to the excess personnel resources typically
wielded by such groups (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Alexander 2002). 14 That is, the
power of citizen groups appears to be a function of their ability to mobilize the public
(Gerber 1999; Braunstein 2004). Since the proliferation of these organizations in the
1970’s, scholars propose that money may be weighted less heavily in today’s ballot
measure campaigns than it has in decades past (Braunstein 2004).

13

A “citizen” group references a non-professional organization that is affiliated with either a particular
ideology, government, or policy goal (Alexander 2002); whereas the term “economic” denotes either trade
groups, businesses, or a professional associations, each of which is concerned with a specific economic or
financial end (Gerber 1999; Alexander 2002).
14
Furthermore, scholars have acknowledged that only a minority of the economic groups within a state
actually possess the monetary resources needed to wage a successful campaign and would in fact have a
resource bias (Gerber 1999).
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Not only do citizen groups tend to be more adept at mobilizing public support for
a measure, but such groups also differ from economic groups in the types of measures
they place on the ballot (Alexander 2002; Braunstein 2004). Citizen groups tend to
sponsor “inclusive” measures (Gerber 1999; Alexander 2002; Braunstein 2004). An
inclusive initiative or popular referendum implies that there is potential for the entire
statewide constituency to be affected by the proposed legislation (Gerber 1996a; 1999). 15
This is contrasted with “exclusive” measures which impact only specific industries or
organizations within the state. 16 Scholars note that inclusive measures are significantly
associated with citizen group sponsorship whereas exclusive measures tend to be the
mark of economic interest groups (Gerber 1996a; Gerber 1999; Braunstein 2004). If most
ballot measures are inclusive in scope, this would provide some preliminary evidence that
citizen legislation may be positively associated with the quality of governance within the
states.
Moreover, the influence of direct legislation is not limited to instances when the
measures pass. That is, the threat of an initiative may stimulate greater governmental
responsiveness to citizen demands for public policy (Gerber 1996a). Through a national
survey of registered lobbying organizations (both economic and citizen groups),
Elisabeth Gerber (1996a; 1999) finds that interest groups may care less about winning a
ballot measure campaign than they do about influencing the state agenda by raising
public awareness. Gerber’s findings appear to undermine the applicability of the resource

15

For instance, initiatives centering on state class-size reduction or English as the official state language
qualify as inclusive measures.
16
An example of an exclusive measure would include Florida’s infamous Amendment 10, the “pregnant
pig” amendment, which prohibited the “mistreatment” of pregnant pigs by confinement to the small cages
used as holding pens for the animals. It is noteworthy that exclusive initiatives or referendums tend to have
lower passage rates, on average, than inclusive ballot items (Gerber 1999; Braunstein 2004).
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bias argument. First, citizen legislating appears to be dominated by non-economic groups.
And when government is perceived to be unresponsive, citizen groups mobilize to
threaten sponsorship of direct legislation on the matter (Gerber 1999). The very threat of
a ballot measure may be sufficient to engender preemptive responsiveness from the
government, specifically state legislatures (Gerber 1999). With the advent of greater data
availability and survey methods, scholars are discovering that citizen legislation does
appear to be citizen controlled, and money may play a much less “nefarious” role than
critics have historically alleged (Gerber 1999; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004, 463).
While many criticisms of direct legislation center on a quantifiable resource bias,
more qualitative considerations have been made as well. Several scholars have charged
that the initiative and referendum are in violation of multiple democratic norms (Donovan
and Bowler 1998b; Cain and Miller 2001). One criticism is that ballot measures are
drafted in isolation and not subjected to the mediating influences of public debate or
compromise (Cain and Miller 2001; Alexander 2002). It is noted that while direct
legislation is most commonly initiated by citizen groups, it is not uncommon for the
sponsoring group to disband following the passage or rejection of a ballot measure
(Boehmke 2002; 2005a). This, in turn, creates another concern; namely who will be held
accountable or bear responsibility for the impact of any policy change that may have
occurred. Citizens, after all, cannot be voted out of office.
Moreover, ballot measures lack official partisan identification. It is alleged that
when combined with abstruse summary wording, the dearth of voting cues or heuristics
may befuddle voters. Critics charge that the public must frequently rely upon one-sided
campaign messages to extrapolate meaning from ballot summaries. Notably, only a
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handful of states require even partial feasibility studies before measures are placed on the
ballot (Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Alexander 2002; Initiative and Referendum Institute
2008). Thus, more often than not, the typical ballot summary reads more like an enticing
advertisement than a serious policy elaboration with both advantages and drawbacks
noted (Alexander 2002). In general, critics suggest little emphasis is placed upon
democratic discourse or dialogue, and this is perceived as troublesome for democratic
norm adherence (Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Cain and Miller 2001; Alexander 2002).
According to critics, direct legislation which is often championed as a means of
imposing government accountability may, itself, lack accountability. It is implied that
citizen legislators inherently lack the capacity to effectively rule, are not held
accountable, and that the result is bad public policy (Cain and Miller 2001). In fact, by
violating democratic values of public disclosure and openness, scholars have charged that
direct legislation is ultimately a roadblock towards achieving good governance (Donovan
and Bowler 1998b; Cain and Miller 2001). However, recent empirical research suggests
otherwise (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004).
The counter argument is that because an initiative or referendum does not have
official political party support or a traditional voting heuristic this does not mean that the
public is incapable of making meaningful associations (Lupia 1994; 2001). All ballot
measures require a group’s sponsorship. And most citizen groups have recognizable
agendas and ideologies (Gerber 1999; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004). This vein of research
suggests that voters are in fact able to employ decision-making heuristics on ballot
measures based upon evaluations of the sponsoring and opposing committees (Lupia and
McCubbins 1998; Lupia 2001; Lupia and Johnston 2001; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004,
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468-9). Thus, the public may not be as wildly incompetent on deciding public policy
matters as critics initially charge.

The Effects of Direct Legislation
While many studies have inquired as to whether or not citizen legislation has been
compromised by a resource bias or is inconsistent with democratic principles a host of
additional research has opted to explore the observable effects of the initiative process.
Indeed, the bulk of initiative and referendum literature inquires as to what effects direct
legislation has upon the state and society. For instance, strong connections have been
uncovered between the initiative process and voter turnout, citizen political knowledge,
and interest group membership (Smith 2001; Smith and Tolbert 2004; Boehmke 2005).
Research suggests the presence of a citizen initiative or popular referendum on a
ballot may boost voter turnout by nearly four percentage points during midterm elections
(Gerber 1999; Smith 2001; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003). Moreover, exposure to
these ballot measures over time appears to lend itself to higher overall levels of political
knowledge within the state citizenry (Smith 2002). Participating in direct legislation also
appears to allow the public to gain valuable civic skills (Smith 2002; Smith and Tolbert
2004). 17 Specifically, research finds that in states where there is at least one ballot
measure present during each election cycle, the average citizen political knowledge levels
tend to be higher than in states with lower or no initiative use (Smith 2002). Average
citizen political knowledge also tends to expand modestly through exposure to direct
legislation over time (Gerber 1999; Smith 2001; 2002; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith
17

Higher political knowledge is defined in the literature as the ability to correctly answer factual questions
about American government and current political issues. Commonly, the notion has been operationalized
by the American National Election Studies (ANES).
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2003). Such findings are textbook arguments for the way in which citizen legislating is
perfect consistent with democratic norms. This indicates that in addition to the obvious
shaping of the policy landscape, citizen legislating appears to play a role in encouraging
democratic participation (Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003).
An equally important finding related to direct legislation is the influence it holds
over the number of citizen groups in a state (Boehmke 2002; 2005). Figure 2 outlines the
percent increase in the number of interest groups due to the adoption of the initiative
process in the states. The interest group population that is most readily transformed by
the presence of direct legislation is the state’s citizen group population (Boehmke 2005).
Specifically, states in which the initiative option is available have, on average, 45% more
citizen groups than non-initiative states (Boehmke 2005, 148).
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Figure 2: Percent Increase in Interest Groups Due to the Initiative Process: 27 States
Source: Frederick Boehmke (2005, 70)
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Notably, as the number of citizen groups rise as a percentage of a state’s total
interest group population, a state may be said to have a more diverse interest group
system (Boehmke 2005). Interest group diversity has been operationalized as the percent
of active lobbying associations within a state that can be classified as citizen groups
(Gray and Lowery 1996; Boehmke 2005). In each of the 50 states, economic groups have
always outnumbered citizen groups (Gray and Lowery 1994; 1996). In states with the
highest numbers of citizen groups, historically (California, New York, and Illinois), the
percent of total interest groups that are citizen associations has never been higher than
45%. 18 Given the baseline disparity of economic to citizen associations, the presence of
direct legislation may assist in balancing a state’s mix of interest groups.
Interestingly, the initiative process itself does not lend itself to higher overall state
interest group populations (Boehmke 2002). This occurs because the initiative process
does not increase the number of active economic groups within a state. Rather, the
influence of the process appears to be focused entirely upon citizen groups. In particular,
the number of citizen groups can and does fluctuate in response to the count of ballot
measures in a state (Gerber 1999; Alexander 2002; Boehmke 2002; 2005).
Fortunately, these expectations lend support to treating a state’s annual ballot
measure count as an explanatory variable in attempts to explain citizen group populations
and to counter potential endogeneity issues. Someone might suggest that more interest
groups equals more citizen initatives, but Frederick Boehmke (2005) establishes that the
primary direction of causality is from direct democracy as an institution to more citizen
groups. The initiative process itself engenders greater citizen group density within a state
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The state in which 45% of its interest group population is made up of citizen groups is California.
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(Boehmke 2002). Moreover, the associated growth in economic groups is dwarfed by the
expansion of citizen associations (see Figure 2).
A state’s ballot measure count may influence its citizen group population through
the spurring of democratic competition (Gerber 1999; Braunstein 2004; Boehmke 2005,
142). Countermeasures are employed as a reaction to original ballot items. Thus, it would
appear that the existence of certain measures engender additional citizen group formation
in order to advocate and sponsor opposing pieces of direct legislation. The very act of
citizen legislating appears to expand the scope of conflict and broaden the interested
public (Boehmke 2005).
It is noteworthy that the initiative process originated and was employed in select
states nearly a century before the proliferation of citizen groups in the 1970’s.
Specifically, the more rural Western states were among the first to adopt and employ the
process. Thus, at least initially, a state’s ballot measure count was largely unrelated to the
number and diversity of interest group populations (Initiative and Referendum Institute
2007). The ballot measures themselves appear to be a product of populism and citizen
efficacy rather than interest group density in the states (Gerber 1999).
In addition to discernable influences on the citizenry, direct legislation also
appears to exert pressure on state government. Research on governmental responsiveness
finds the mere threat of an initiative effects state legislative behavior (Garrett 1999;
Gerber 1999; Gerber 2001; Alexander 2002). The legislative agenda will often shift to
accommodate the potential ballot measure. A comparable piece of related legislation will
be taken up by the state legislature while the initiative or referendum is circulating
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through the signature acquisition phase. 19 Consequently, higher ballot measure counts
appear to be associated with noticeable changes in legislative agendas. Advocates argue
that this agenda shift is evidence of greater governmental responsiveness to the public, a
healthy by-product of direct democracy in the form of citizen legislating.
Moreover, there is evidence that both economic and citizen interest groups may
employ this threat of initiative or referendum to gain the government’s attention for their
cause (Gerber 1996b; Nicholson 2005). The threat alone increases issue salience and it is
precisely because of this “gun behind the door” that ballot measure counts are employed
as a key explanatory variable in much research, rather than the number of ballot measures
passed (Lascher, Hagan, and Rochlin 1996, 760). Direct legislation appears to exert
influence on the state of governance regardless of whether its associated policies make it
into law.
Notably however, there is little consensus on whether the initiative process is
associated with greater public opinion-government policy congruence (Lascher, Hagen,
and Rochlin 1996; Matsusaka 2004). For instance, in California, the government’s action
in the revision of the state’s tax policy during the 1990s and industry regulation is not
mirrored by public support for the policies (Donovan and Bowler 1998b). Such opinionpolicy incongruence persists despite California having one of the strongest traditions of
direct legislation (Camobreco 1998; Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001). In the end,
while findings suggest that ballot measures induce a “responsive shift” in government
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Is has also been noted that lobbying groups may employ the threat of an initiative (outside strategy) to
acquire more inside access to state legislators (Boehmke 2005, 138-40, 142).
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policy, it is not entirely clear if this shift moves policy into greater alignment with public
opinion (Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001). 20
Indeed, critics of direct democracy charge that citizen legislation does not solidify the
public opinion-public policy connection (Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Camobreco
1998, 828). However, some of these same researchers argue ballot measures may serve
as valid “points in time” gauges of public sentiment on a specific policy (Lascher, Hagen,
and Rochlin 1996, 772). While direct legislation does not necessarily engender opinionpolicy congruence, it may be a useful tool to observe cross-sections of the political and
policy climate over many years.
It should be noted that state policy is a dynamic creature. Policies shed and
accumulate popular support over time and through public deliberation. Public policy is
contextually dependent (Sharp 1999). Consequently, exploring the influences of citizen
legislating upon the state of governance may require a dependent variable that is less
situation-specific than “popular support” (or lack thereof) for a particular public policy at
a single point in time. Consequently, this study advocates a methodological revision to
the existing opinion-policy congruence model. Specifically, ideology is proposed as a
more appropriate dependent variable when modeling the governance process. Ideology
does not limit itself to specific public policies or context; ideological dispositions tend to
be stable and coherent across time (Converse 1964, 206-8). Ideology, on the traditional
left-right continuum, allows for greater validity and continuity in exploring the potential
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This issue is termed by John G. Matsusaka (2004) as the question “of the many or the few.” (3).
Matsusaka finds evidence that passing ballot items are generally in congruence with majority public
opinion. Moreover, scholars note that there appears to be sizable opinion-policy congruence on proposed
initiatives that are symbolic in content. Such measures tend to have few substantive or technical
implications (Carmines and Stimson, 1980; Gerber 1999; Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001).
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associations between citizen legislating and governmental responsiveness, a substantive
facet of good governance. 21
Regarding government policy outputs, there is strong evidence that extensive use
of the initiative process is associated with a reduction in the size and centralization of
state government, as well as less financial redistribution of state wealth (Matsusaka 1995,
2004). And, it should come as no surprise that extensive use of direct legislation
purportedly complicates state budgeting processes and taxation methods (Donovan and
Bowler 1998b).
While ballot measures interact with representative democracy in ways that might
“partially remedy one [governmental] defect” such as a lack of “responsiveness,” it may
exacerbate rival problems in the state government such as budget balancing (Donovan
and Bowler 1998b, 271). States that frequently employ the initiative, for instance, are less
likely to employ progressive taxation (in which the wealthiest citizens pay greater
proportions of their annual income in state taxes than do those who are less well-to-do). 22
Consequently, the more disadvantaged citizens pay a disproportionate share of the
funding for public services in less progressive tax systems, which occur
disproportionately in states with high use of citizen initiatives (Matsusaka 1995; Lascher,
Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Donovan and Bowler 1998b, 259). Thus, it seems that passing
or even proposing ballot measures may serve as effective mandates to state government

21

Specifically, this research uses the ideology of a state citizenry and the ideology of a state government to
calculate the dependent variable “ideological distance” that will serve as a measure of elite/mass policy
congruence (see Berry et al. 1998). The ideological distance calculation will be detailed in the research
design section.
22
“High-use” states are outlined by the Initiative and Referendum Institute (2007). Notably, states with the
initiative are also associated with a decentralization of spending (Matsusaka 2004, 3). That is, state
governments in initiative states appear to pass the buck to local governments significantly more than
noninitiative states (Matsusaka 1995; 2004; 2008). However, this phenomenon has yet to be systematically
tied to the actual usage of the initiative process.
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regarding desired public policy. As a result, balanced budgets may be displaced in favor
of financing costly ballot measure policies. Donovan and Bowler (1998b) note that:
Contrary to what Progressive advocates might have expected, [the initiative
process] does not necessarily cause more “responsible” budgeting in the long
run… By frequently presenting voters with only part of the fiscal equation
(cutting taxes, maybe borrowing, but rarely spending choices or raising new
revenue), direct democracy places the state legislature in a position where it might
be extremely difficult for them to write a budget (264).

Paradoxically however, there is also evidence to suggest that greater initiative usage is
associated with lower government spending at the state level across the board (Matsusaka
1995). While the initiative process, both directly (through passage) and indirectly
(through “threat”), is related to costly public policy implementation that may impede
financial responsibility, direct legislation is also associated with the imposition of debt
limitation provisions and spending caps which may aid state fiscal health (Matsusaka
1995; 2008; Gerber 1998; 1999; Initiative and Referendum Institute 2007). 23
This study will attempt to discern the underlying influences of direct legislation
upon state fiscal health and financial responsibility; one possible substantive indicator of
good governance. Here, the study diverges from extant research by operationalizing fiscal
health by year-end reserves instead of general state revenues and expenditures. Year-end
reserves are calculated by taking the total monetary amount remaining in a state’s coffers
at the end of each fiscal year, including rainy day funds, and then dividing by the state’s
total expenditures. Ultimately, this renders a state’s year-end reserves as a percentage of
its total expenditures to control for the significant unit effects between states in budget
size as well as the occurrence of random natural disasters across the regions. It will be
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Studies indicate that initiative use within states is related to less redistribution of state wealth (Matsusaka
1995, 620).
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argued that larger year-end reserves are positive indicators of substantive good
governance.
Still other research on direct legislation focuses on how it shapes specific public
policies (Bone and Benedict 1975; Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Matsusaka 2008). For
instance, when the initiative process is available within a state, there is a greater
likelihood that the state will adopt English-only laws, Indian gaming amendments,
legislative term limits, capital punishment, and gay marriage bans (Tatalovich 1995; Cain
and Miller 2001; Schildkraut 2001; Boehmke 2005; Boehmke et al. 2006). 24 Nearly all of
these policies in the American states have their origins in citizen legislation, and each is
frequently seen as controversial. Such initiative-policy connections invoke the recurrent
question of how desirable citizen legislating truly, especially when one considers the
process is associated with socially and politically intolerant public policy views (Wenzel,
Donovan, and Bowler 1998; Yi 2008). Indeed, legislating through initiative does appear
to have produced measures that adversely affect minority groups such as limited-English
proficiency residents as well as the gay and lesbian populations within states (Magelby
1984; Tatalovich 1995; Tolbert and Hero 1998; Schildkraut 2001).
Critics have linked political intolerance (Tatalovich 1995; Schildkraut 2001) and
fiscal irresponsibility (Donovan and Bowler 1998b) to the presence of the initiative
process in states. Implicit within these studies is the question of how desirable citizen
legislating truly is for overall quality governance. To date, few efforts have been made to
tie citizen legislation in any systematic way to the quality of governance as a whole,
opting instead, to point out specific ways that it has been either effective or ineffective in
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It is important to note that the likelihood of these policy adoptions is also easily tied to overall state
citizen ideology (Boehmke 2005).
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specific circumstances and often in specific states. This research will attempt to rectify
the lack of a macro-level approach o the desirability of citizen legislating. 25

Literature Conclusions
Ultimately, there exists a maddening list of potential implications stemming from
the initiative and popular referendum literature. However, a single theoretical question
does run throughout much of the literature: Is citizen legislating ultimately helpful or
harmful to governance? Contemporary direct democracy was established to combat
legislative collusion. The initiative was a rallying cry for better governance. To some
extent, it still is today. 26 But is citizen legislating associated with indicators of good
governance in any systematic way? Extant literature leaves us with conflicting findings
that lack a holistic approach to test this longstanding query of political science.
Furthermore, interpreting the existent findings depends upon how the question of
good governance is framed, in what context the concepts are operationalized, and which
methodology is employed. For instance, initiatives and referendums are at times framed
as “good” because they are associated with higher voter turnout and citizen political
knowledge (Smith 2001; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003). However, they may also be
“bad” as theory suggests that direct legislation may discourage long term fiscal
responsibility and violate democratic norms (Cupps 1977; Donovan and Bowler 1998b).
Ballot measures are beneficial because they appear to encourage legislative
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A notable exception is the work by Russell J. Dalton (2004) who employed state education spending as a
surrogate measure for good governance.
26
A state’s annual ballot measure count and the average passage rate of the measures have been employed
in past research as aggregate level surrogates for public distrust of state government (Matsusaka 1992;
Braunstein 2004). It has traditionally been held that higher levels of initiative or referendum usage may be
indicative of low trust in government (Banducci 1998; Ellis 2002; Braunstein 2004).
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responsiveness (Gerber 1999). However, the measures may also warrant skepticism
because it is uncertain whether or not it is the true policy preferences of the general
public (Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996).
Many studies have established an understanding of the initiative’s operational
mechanics; when ballot measures appear, when they pass, and what determines the
passage rates of the measures (Banducci 1998; Gerber 1999; Alexander 2002; Braunstein
2004). Work has also established how the availability of the initiative process influences
specific state policies and government spending patterns (Matsusaka 2005) However, a
preponderance of the explanatory models have been restricted in focus, limiting direct
legislation to a singular topic or treating it as a stationary institution. Commonly, the
construct is operationalized by a dummy variable that denotes whether or not the
initiative process is available in a state (Tatalovich 1995; Wenzel, Donovan, and Bowler
1998; Zadovny 2000; Boehmke 2005).
In contrast, this study conceptualizes the initiative and popular referendum as a
dynamic arm of citizen legislating. It is proposed that its influence over governance
extends beyond what the traditional binary variable can capture. Simply because the
process is available within a state does not guarantee usage. States such as Illinois,
Mississippi, and Wyoming all allow for the citizen initiative. The process, however, is
almost never employed in these states. Thus, despite the institutional presence of direct
legislation, a state may be void of any actual citizen legislating.
This study attempts to frame the interplay of direct democracy with political
reality in terms of governance; specifically, good governance. Building upon relevant
literature, the effort is made to move beyond the specifics and to envisage a bigger
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picture. That is, there is a sense that research has seemingly lost the forest for the trees.
Consequently, a more holistic vantage point with which to view direct legislation is
sought. This study constructs an additive index gauging the degree of “good governance”
that is present within each state during a given year and compliments this with a measure
of the actual frequency of the usage of citizen legislating. 27 In the end, it is hoped the
results of this study will firmly establish a first step towards a more comprehensive
understanding of this elemental and recurring question in political science; the question
of the citizen legislator. What implications are in store for good governance when the
public is emboldened through direct democracy?
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Additionally, it is intended to provide a test of conclusions drawn within the initiative literature. For
instance, the link between initiative usage and voter turnout is reexamined (Smith 2001).
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN
The empirical component of this research has significant obstacles to maneuver.
Not the least of which is the creation of a “good governance” index. It will also be
necessary to operationalize the degree of citizen legislating that is present within each
state. As noted earlier, this study will use a state’s annual ballot measure count to this
end. Previous work which has dealt with “good governance” as the dependent variable
has employed one dimensional surrogate measures such as state education spending
(Dalton 2004) or voter turnout (Smith 2001). However, the idea of good governance is
not particular simple and would likely benefit from something more than a one
dimensional surrogate. This study attempts to achieve a multi-dimensional indicator of
quality governance. Then, in order to gauge the influence of citizen legislation on good
governance, the proposed index will be scrutinized by legislative, institutional,
ideological, and demographic considerations or variables. 28

Dependent Variable – Good Governance
Through the construction of an additive index gauging the effects of a state’s
ballot measure count upon “good governance,” this research attempts to acquire a more
holistic understanding of direct democracy. Political theory instructs that contemporary
conceptions of “good governance” must include both substantive and procedural facets
(Rousseau [1762] 1988; Plato [360 B.C.E.] 1997; Habermas 1998; Dahl 2005; Rawls
2005). Consequent to this, the research will expound an index that is multi-dimensional,
containing four component parts.
28

It should be noted that while the degree of citizen legislating that is present within a state at the aggregate
level may qualify as an institutional facet, it is handled as a dynamic legislative mechanism for the
purposes of this study.
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Two of these factors are intended to capture the substantive side of governance:
fiscal health as operationalized by annual state year-end reserves and, second, the
ideological distance between a state’s government and its citizenry. Year-end reserves
reflect the total budgetary surplus within each state expressed as a percentage of total
annual expenditures. This allows control for variation in state legislative professionalism,
economic downturns, and natural disasters which may also impact a state’s fiscal health
(Eckl 2007; Thatcher 2008). On average, greater year-end reserves are substantive
indicators of good governance at work. Ideological distance between a state government
and its citizenry captures the degree of substantive representation, or rather a lack thereof
that is present in the aggregate. This variable is operationalized by subtracting a state’s
annual citizen ideology score from its annual government ideology score and taking the
absolute value of this number (Berry et al. 1998). Originally, state and citizen ideology
scores range from 0, perfect ideological conservatism, to 1, perfect liberalism. 29 Good
governance is reflected in low ideological distance, indicating that representative
democracy remains representative (Habermas 1998).
The remaining two components of governance embody its procedural
dimension. Procedure references the degree of public inclusiveness that the governing
system allows. Voter turnout is the first procedural consideration. Total voter turnout is
calculated for even year elections by taking a state’s voting eligible population and
dividing by total votes cast for the highest office (McDonald and Popkin 2001). States
with higher voter turnout signify greater procedural governance. The remaining
component is state interest group diversity. A diverse interest group population may
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Data for ideology scores, including the most recent updates, are available on Richard Fording’s
homepage at: http://www.uky.edu/%7Erford/Home_files/page0002.htm.
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entail greater public inclusiveness in the representative process (Gray and Lowery 1996;
Boehmke 2002). Virginia Gray and David Lowery’s data on state interest group
populations are employed in calculating interest group diversity. Specifically, the variable
is operationalized as the percentage of a state’s total active interest groups which are
classified as citizen groups, as opposed to economic groups (Gray and Lowery 1996;
Gerber 1999). Citizen groups are inherently diverse. For instance, citizen groups may be
environmental, governance, law and order, social services, or moral values related (Berry
1993; Gray and Lowery 1994; 1996; Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Braunstein 2004). In
contrast, economic groups are almost always financial in nature (Walker 1991; Gerber
1999; Alexander 2002; Braunstein 2004). Furthermore, citizen groups have historically
comprised a minority of the active lobbying organizations in the states. Even among
states with diverse lobbying associations, citizen groups have never comprised more than
45% of any state interest group system. 30 Thus, as citizen groups comprise a higher
percentage of a state’s interest group system, there appears to be a more even split
between citizen and economic interests within a state (Gray and Lowery 1996;
Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Boehmke 2005).
Good governance should promote a diverse slate of interest representation and
expand the scope of conflict (Schattschneider 1960; Habermas 1998). Interest group
diversity, however, is also indirectly linked to good governance by engendering a more
involved and informed citizenry (Boehmke 2005), as group membership is associated
with greater political knowledge and efficacy (Lowery and Gray 1993; Donovan and
Bowler 1998; Putnam 2000).

30

This state is California.
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Notably, this study does not use citizen group density as an indicator of good
governance within the states. Higher citizen group head counts do not necessarily spell
better governance (Putnam 2000). Citizen associations have at times advocated radical
ideologies and promoted social or political intolerance (Walker 1991; Putnam 2000;
Zavodny 2000; Schildkraut 2001). Thus, higher numbers of citizen groups do not entail
genuine procedural legitimacy. Rather, it is the diversity of a state’s interest group system
employed as a procedural indicator of governance.
Table 1 reports the bivariate correlations between each of the four SGGI
components. As expected, no significant associations or dependencies between any of the
four variables emerge. As theory asserts that governance is multi-dimensional, it would
be problematic if the index parts were highly correlated with one another (Rousseau 1988
[1762]; Warren 1993; Habermas 1998; Rawls 2005). If high inter-item correlations were
present, this would indicate that the four components tap only a single dimension. In such
a case, the empirical model would offer little elucidation as the holistic desirability of
citizen legislation.
Table 1: Bivariate Correlations, SGGI Components

Voter Turnout
YER
Int. Group Diversity
Ideol. Distance

Voter
Turnout
-

Year-end Reserves
(YER)
0.08
-
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Int. Gr.
Diversity
0.21
0.15
-

Ideol.
Distance
-0.10
-0.01
-0.15
-

Once the four components of the index are assembled, biennial rankings are
calculated by state. For each year included in the study, the states are ranked separately
on a scale of 1 to 50 for all four variables.31 Rankings are coded such that as values
approach 50, the state is said to be marked by good governance. For instance, states with
greater voter turnout, year-end reserves, and interest group diversity will receive scores
closer to 50 than those states whose annual turnout is lower by comparison. States with
lower biennial ideological distance will receive higher rankings than those plagued by
greater ideological distance between the government and its citizenry.
Finally, the rankings for each of these four components are combined to form an
additive index of good governance (SGGI). By design, the index ranges from a minimum
score of 4, denoting less than optimal governance, to 200, which represents good
governance. For example, to attain an index score of 4 for a specific year, a state must
possess the lowest annual voter turnout, year-end reserves, interest group diversity, and
the greatest ideological distance in comparison to other states. In theory, good
governance as an ideal type is set and stable. However, in empirical reality, the state of
governance must be comparative and thus also relative to similar units of analysis. More
importantly, any multiplicative or additive index arising out of the raw data from the
components would generate abnormally high governance scores for outlier states such as
Alaska which traditionally has an abundance of year-end reserves. For this reason, an
index rooted in rank seems particularly appropriate.
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States with identical values on one or more of the index components are given the same rank for that
year.
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For the time period studied (1980-2000), the mean SGGI score is 103.00. Its
proximity to the median value (99.80) indicates that data are normally distributed. 32 This
also provides ideal testing circumstances, as normality is a common assumption in
regression analysis. Figure 3 examines the distribution of the SGGI by transforming each
value into a z-score. The maximum and minimum governance values that appear in the
data are 162 and 54, respectively. As evidenced in Figure 3, these values are positioned
just outside the negative and positive two standard deviation boundaries.

Figure 3: Good Governance Frequency Distribution, 1980-2000
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The standard deviation is 32.67.
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While literature on the initiative and popular referendum processes abounds and is
indispensably informative, the bulk of focus has been upon individual or microcosmic
components of government and governance rather than a systematic or holistic approach.
The methodology employed within this study presumes that the whole is, in fact, greater
than the sum of its parts. 33
Key Explanatory Variable – Citizen Legislating
Citizen legislating is operationalized by the total number of citizen initiatives or
popular referendums that appeared on a state-wide ballot every two years for each of the
fifty states. States that opt not to employ direct legislation or do not have either process
available are coded 0, indicating an absence of citizen legislation. 34
All else being equal, citizen legislation should be positively associated with
higher state governance scores. In theory, direct legislation imposes an unavoidable
accountability upon government (Rousseau 1988 [1762]; Schmidt 1989). This
responsiveness is thought to be a bedrock tenet of direct democracy. That is, when
government steps out of line ideologically, it is the job of the citizenry to stand up and
enforce substantive representation (Schmidt 1989; Smith 2002; Braunstein 2004;
Matsusaka 2004).
For the procedural indicators of governance, the presence of a ballot measure
offers a modest increase in voter turnout during that electoral cycle (Everson 1981; Smith
33

The four component parts of the index have accumulated substantial bodies of literature. Specifically,
studies abound in the area of voter turnout (McDonald and Popkin 2001; Smith 2001; Brown, Jackson, and
Wright 1999; Jackson 1996; Lee and Berry 1982). In an effort to demonstrate the validity of the proposed
good governance index, four appendix models are constructed. These are auxiliary models that demonstrate
how relationships uncovered in literature continue to hold in this data. Consequently, each of the four index
components are measured against their key explanatory variables as reported or theorized in prior work. All
references to ballot measures have been excluded from consideration. Appendices A through D contain
these simplified regression analyses. There, brief summaries of the models and results will be reported.
34
Government sponsored initiatives and referendums are excluded from analysis as these measures are not
citizen initiated.
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2001; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003). Additionally, citizen legislating also appears to
alter a state’s interest group landscape (Boehmke 2002; 2005). Both the availability and
the frequency with which a state employs the initiative influences the state’s citizen
group population (Walker 1991; Gray and Lowery 1996; Tocqueville 2000 [1835]). For
instance, when states the public to employ the initiative or popular referendum, citizen
groups tend to proliferate more than economic groups (Boehmke 2005). Moreover,
higher ballot measure counts increase the likelihood that additional citizen groups will
form and sponsor counter-measures (Gerber 1999; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003;
Braunstein 2004). Consequently, citizen legislating effectively enlarges state interest
representation by expanding the scope of conflict (Schattschneider 1960).
Among the substantive indicators of governance, findings have been more
conflicting. Regarding state fiscal health, some studies assert that direct legislation leads
to costly and unwise public policy implementation (Clingermayer and Wood 1995;
Donovan and Bowler 1998b). However, others have found no valid link between citizeninitiated legislation and financial crises in the states once extant state debt and spending
patterns are held constant (Matsusaka 1992; 2004; 2008; Thatcher 2008).

Institutional Influences
In political science research, findings have demonstrated that institutions matter.
That is, institutional influences bear, at minimum, comparable explanatory weight as
contextual or demographical characteristics in units of analysis (Easton 1970). State
institutional settings almost assuredly have a substantial impact upon the quality of
governance. For the purpose of model specification, factors such as legislative
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professionalism, interparty competition, difficulty of voter registration, divided
government, and state legislative term limits are controlled for.
Legislative professionalism is operationalized by the Squire index, in which state
scores range from 0, indicating legislative “amateurism”, to a score of 1 which indicates a
“professionalism” equivalent to the U.S. Congress. 35 Professionalism is linked to several
components of the SGGI. Namely, ideological distance, interest group diversity, and
year-end reserves bear strong associations with legislative professionalism. For instance,
there is evidence that progressively ambitious careerists are more likely to be
concentrated in professional legislatures than in states with more amateur legislative
bodies (Squire 1993; Maestas 2000, 664; Squire and Hamm 2005). The result is a
clustering of constituent-conscious legislators in states with more professionalized
chambers (Chaffey 1970; Hofstetter 1971; Hibbing 1986; Berkman 1993; Mooney 1995;
Berry 2000; Maestas 2000). This may minimize ideological distance between the
government and the citizenry. While less ideological distance is a decidedly positive asset
to governance, legislative professionalism has also been associated with fewer year-end
reserves as a function of rampant government spending and less interest group diversity
(Banducci 1998; Berkman 2001). 36
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For the 1980 entries, the 1979 Squire index scores are employed. From 1982 through 1984, 1986 and
1979 professionalism scores are averaged. For 1986 and 1989, 1986 Squire index calculations are used. For
1990 and 1992, the states’ 1989 and 1996 index values are averaged. For 1994 and 1996, the 1996 Squire
index scores are employed. And finally, 1998 and 2000 entries are calculated by average the states’ 1996
and 2003 scores. This depicts the steady changes in legislative professionalism over time.
36
Again, it would be a mistake to operationalize the diversity of state interest groups by employing a strict
head count of active groups. This would likely be confounded with legislative professionalism itself.
Professionalized states also tend to have less homogenous populations and thus more heterogeneous
interests in play; such states simply have more resources available for consumption (Squire 1992; Gray and
Lowery 1996; Berkman 2001). Thus, while professionalized states will almost assuredly have more interest
groups in raw numbers, there may be great disparity between economic and citizen groups.
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Interparty competition is also a relevant consideration in the study of quality
governance (see Hill and Leighley 1993). Notably, interparty competition has been tied to
less ideological distance and greater voter turnout in the states (see Downs 1957 and
Jackson 1996, respectively). Intuitively then, interparty competition should wield a
positive influence on quality governance (Barrilleaux 1986; Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and
Langer 2002). Most indices of party competition, however, are measurements of
competition over time. Consequently, they are available only on a per-decade basis (see
Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993). 37 Because of this limitation, a more rudimentary measure
that enables annual variation in party competition values is employed. The percentage of
a state House that is Democrat is subtracted from the percent that is Republican. 38 Next,
the absolute value of this number is taken, rendering a scale ranging from 0 to 100.
Finally, the scale is inverted so that higher numbers represent more even splits between
the two parties at the state legislative level.
Additional institutional controls include the difficulty of voter registration,
divided government, and state legislative term limits. Key to the explanation of voter
turnout is the difficulty of voter registration (Jackson 1996). Difficulty of voter
registration is operationalized by the number of days before an election that voter
registration closes. It should be negatively related to quality governance, as it hinders
public participation and inclusiveness in the political process.
Also, government is said to behave differently when it is divided (Bowman and
Kearney 2002); that is, when a single political party controls, at most, two of the three
37

One of the most popular measures of interparty competition is the time-honored Ranney index.
Due to the extreme dearth of independents and third party members in state legislatures, these numbers
are excluded from calculations. Nebraska is the only state with a unicameral legislature that is chosen
through nonpartisan elections. To compensate for this, the state’s congressional House delegation is used to
calculate interparty competition.
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elected bodies of state government including the governorship, the state House and state
Senate. 39 Prior work has argued that when divided government is present, there is greater
accountability and attentiveness to the public on account of uncertain political futures for
the parties in government (Fiorina 1989; 1994; Bowman and Kearney 2002). For each
case, a state is scored 1 if divided government is present and 0 otherwise (if a single
political party controls the governorship, the state House, and state Senate).
A dummy variable is also created to control for the presence of state legislative
term limits. States in which term limits are present are coded 1 and 0 if no such measures
are in place. There are conflicting expectations for state legislative term limits. On one
hand, they are thought to enhance accountability and to ensure new individuals and ideas
are moving into the chambers (Squire and Hamm 2005, 63-4). However, there is also the
potential for legislative dependency upon interest groups and lobbying forces for
information and clarification as new legislators learn the ropes (Bowman and Kearney
2002). Potentially, these institutional settings offer telling specifications.

Ideological Considerations
In addition to suspected institutional influences upon the state of governance,
ideological considerations are made as well. Specifically, the degree of ideological
extremism within a state’s citizenry and government liberalism are controlled for in the
comprehensive model.
Ideological extremism is generally equated with ideological coherence (Converse
1964). Moreover, a citizenry that is imbued with a strong sense of ideology is also, on
39

Once more, Nebraska’s unicameral and nonpartisan legislature poses a methodological issue. The state’s
divided government score is calculated by employing their House and Senate congressional delegation as
proxies for the state legislature.
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average, a more active and efficacious one as well (Weissberg 1975; Hanson 1980;
Fitzpatrick and Hero 1988). Both citizen activity and efficacy are textbook ingredients for
quality governance (Rousseau 1988 [1762]; Habermas 1998; Rawls 2005). Thus, it is
anticipated the states with more ideologically extreme citizenries will be positively
associated with better quality governance. Citizen ideological extremism is measured by
transforming a state’s value on the Citizen Ideology index (see Berry et al. 1998) into a zscore and taking the absolute value of the number. This renders a scale which captures
extremism, regardless of direction on the left-right continuum. Government liberalism
appears to influence the general health of state finances and year-end reserves in
particular (Squire 1992; 1993; Bowman and Kearney 2002, Ch. 6; Eckl 2007). Simply
and perhaps predictably, when state government is more liberal, the state tends to possess
fewer year-end reserves (Squire 1992; Bowman and Kearney 2002, Ch. 6). 40 Government
liberalism is operationalized by the Government Ideology index in which state scores
range from 0 to 1 in which higher scores denote greater government liberalism (Berry et
al. 1998).

Demographic Controls
Relevant demographic controls are also be implemented. These five variables
include the education of the electorate, whether a state may be classified as having a
“traditionalistic” political culture, gross state product-squared, state debt per capita, and
the state unemployment rate.
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Intuitively, liberal governments tend to spend more across the board and specifically devote more
resources to social welfare programs (Squire 1992; King 2000; Bowman and Kearney 2002, Ch. 6).
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An educated electorate should demand better governance, and more importantly,
recognize good public policy (Schmidt 1989; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003). Thus, a
positive relationship between education and a state’s SGGI score is expected. The
education of the electorate is operationalized by the percent of a state’s population that
has a four year degree or higher. Education explains a disproportionate amount of
variance in voter turnout models (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Rosenstone and
Hansen 2003).
Equally important as education is the notion of a state’s political culture. Culture
has traditionally been measured by a dummy variable denoting whether or not a state can
be classified as southern. A more viable alternative to the popular south dummy is the
variable of traditionalistic political culture (Elazar 1966; Patterson 1968; Johnson 1976;
Fitzpatrick and Hero 1988; Layman and Carmines 1997). Rooted in both current and
historical trends in religious attendance, the traditionalistic culture variable is arguably a
more direct measurement of state culture than simply its geographical placement.
Traditionalistic political cultures are less politically inclusive, less efficacious, and have
less politically knowledgeable electorates (Johnson 1976; Fitzpatrick and Hero 1988;
Layman and Carmines 1997). All else being equal, states with traditionalistic political
cultures are simply less likely to exhibit signs of quality governance and must be
controlled for. Traditionalistic states are coded 1, and all others are denoted 0.
Gross state product (GSP) is an integral control for the state interest group
diversity component of good governance. GSP alone comprises one third of the ESA-
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model of interest group density (see Gray and Lowery 1996). 41 This variable represents
the energy or resources of a state that are available for consumption. Consequently, states
with higher GSP are likely to have more active interest groups across the board (Gray and
Lowery 1994). However, GSP is inherently heteroscedastistic across the 50 states.
Consequently, it is a state’s GSP-squared that is included in the model and renders the
correct functional form (Gray and Lowery 1996).
The final two demographic variables under consideration are a state’s debt per
capita and the state unemployment rate. With its strong negative relationship to year-end
reserves, debt per capita (in millions) should be negatively related to a state’s SGGI
score. 42 Since debt may influence the capacity of a state to provide quality governance, it
is a necessarily demographic control. The percent of a state’s workforce facing
unemployment may also impede quality governance. When the public is confronted with
dismal economic conditions, it may be less likely join citizen groups or may simply
demand policies that focus upon economic recovery at the expense of post-material
issues.
Table 2 showcases the good governance model. By controlling for relevant
institutional, ideological, and demographic factors, this study aims to disentangle the
influences of citizen legislating by examining good governance from a more holistic
perspective.
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The ESA-model asserts that state interest group populations are largely a function of a state’s energy
(resources available for consumption), stability (stability of party control in government), and area. See
Gray and Lowery (1994; 1996) for a detailed discussion of the ESA-model.
42
There is much variation between the states in debt loads. This variation is readily observable on an
annual basis. See any volume of the Book of the States for reports on state debt per capita.
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Table 2: Good Governance Holistic Model Summary
Variables (exp. sign)

Coding

Key Explanatory
Citizen Legislating (+)

No. biennial ballot measures in a
state

Institutional Influences
Legislative Professionalism (-)

Squire index of legislative
professionalism (0 - 1)
Abs (% House Dem - % House Rep)

Interparty Competition (+)
Difficulty of Voter registration (-)

No. days before election voter
registration closes
Coded 1 if divided gov’t is present
in a state; coded 0 if unified gov’t
Coded 1 if state leg. term limits are
present in a given year; 0 if absent

Divided Government (+)
State Legislative Term Limits (-)
Ideological Considerations
Government Liberalism (-)

State Gov’t Ideology Index (0-100);
higher scores denote greater liberal.
Z-score of State Citizen Ideology
Index (0-100); higher z-scores denote
greater extremism

Citizen Ideological Extremism (+)

Demographic Controls
% College Grads in State (+)

% state pop. that has a four year
degree or higher
Coded 1 for states with trad. political
culture; and 0 if non-trad.
GSP-squared by state and year in
millions
Dept per capita by state and year in
millions
% of state pop. that is classified by
US Census Bureau as unemployed
by year

Traditional Political Culture (-)
Gross State Product-squared (+)
State Debt Per Capita (-)
Unemployment (-)
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Method
Table 2 outlines the comprehensive regression model as well as the expected
relationship between the variables and quality governance. The study employs a pooled
cross-sectional design spanning 20 years (1980-2000). As is common in pooled models,
significant unit and time effects are present between the states. To correct for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation that is innate to the research design, the model is
run using a random-effects generalized-least squares regression (GLS). GLS is, in effect,
ordinary least squares (OLS) with a corrective weight term added which adjusts the
standard errors of the coefficients (Gujarati 1995, Ch. 11).
Econometric texts instruct that “in the presence of autocorrelation or
heteroscedasticity, GLS is preferable to OLS and produces unbiased estimators” (Gujarati
1995, 367). Moreover, a random-effects model assumes that the nature of
heteroscedasticity varies either by year or by value of the independent variables. That is
to say, the effects of heteroscedasticity are not fixed. An example of a fixed-effect is
gross state product, which is inherently heteroscedastistic (see Gray and Lower 1996) but
is readily corrected by including the squared values of state GSP. A random-effect, on the
other hand, is not as easily remedied, as the problematic error term changes in degree and
nature over time. Consequently, a random-effects GLS regression adjusts the standard
errors to produce a more statistically conservative test (Gujarati 1995, Ch. 11, 12). The
following model is run:
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Good Governance = a + b1(Citizen Legislation) – b2(Legislative Professionalism)
– b3(Difficulty of Voter Registration) + b4(Divided Government)
– b5(Legislative Term Limits) – b6(Government Liberalism)
+ b7(Citizen Ideological Extremism) + b8(% College Grads in State)
-- b9(Traditionalistic Political Culture) + b10(GSP2)
– b11(State Debt Per Capita) – b12(State Unemployment) + et
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IV. RESULTS & DISCUSSION
A majority of extant research has held citizen legislation against one dependent
variable, such as state fiscal health, at a time. Consequently, a myriad of conflicting
conclusions have been drawn given citizen legislating a mixed reputation. When
econometric models are limited to single or one-dimensional measures of governance,
general theoretical conclusions on contemporary direct democracy are hard to come by.
The key objective of this study is to model direct legislation against a holistic measure of
governance and to allow for more general conclusions regarding its desirability.

Key Explanatory Variable – Citizen Legislating
Citizen legislation, a state’s ballot measure count, is positively associated with all
four substantive and procedural indicators of good governance. 43 Table 3 examines the
bivariate correlations for each of the four SGGI components with a state’s biennial ballot
measure count. The positive relationship with voter turnout holds (Smith 2001; Tolbert et
al. 2003); as does its negative relationship with ideological distance (Schmidt 1989;
Gerber 1996; Berry et al. 1998). Furthermore, when fiscal health is conceptualized as
annual year-end reserves, rather than raw state spending data, direct legislation is
modestly associated with a reigning-in of state fiscal management (Matsusaka 2004;
2008).

Table 3: Bivariate Correlations, Citizen Legis. and SGGI Components, 1980-2000
Voter Turnout
Citizen Legis.

0.26

Year-end Res.
0.26
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Ideological Dist.

Int. Group Divers.

-.23

0.21

It is negatively associated with ideological distance between a state’s government and its citizenry. Thus,
less ideological distance is equated to better quality governance.
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Table 3 demonstrates, at best, a modest association between citizen legislating
and each of the four governance indicators. However, it should not be concluded just yet
that direct legislation exhibits only a minute effect upon governance. 44 When considering
governance, this study proposes that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. That is,
when modeling governance, it must be considered as a single holistic construct. Citizen
legislation is frequently on trial for influencing “the state of governance”, for better or
worse (Donovan and Bowler 1998; Smith 2001; Alexander 2002; Tolbert et al. 2003;
Braunstein 2004; Matsusaka 2004). Yet, it is typically tried against pieces of
“substantive” governance, state spending for instance, held in isolation from the
theoretical whole. Moreover, critics rarely give due credit for its embodiment of
“procedural” inclusiveness.
Once citizen legislation is held against a comparative and more holistic measure
of good governance, its influence appears to be anything but modest. The Pearson’s r
correlation statistic between citizen legislation and the cumulative index is notably
greater than any of the singular correlations found in Table 3 (r = .46). Findings from
regression analysis are even stronger. Holding constant key institutional, ideological, and
demographic control variables, GLS regression output in Table 4 reveals remarkably
clear and coherent support for citizen legislating. As state ballot measures grow in
number, the state obtains significantly higher SGGI scores. It is also particularly
promising that each variable influences governance in the hypothesized direction. Table 4
contains the comprehensive Good Governance regression output. The coefficients help to
paint a particularly robust portrait of the citizen legislator.
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Granted, even if citizen legislating were limited to a “minute effect” on governance, this would still be a
potentially fatal blow to critics of direct democracy.
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Table 4: Good Governance Regression, 1980-2000
Variables

Expected Sign

Model

Key Explanatory
Citizen Legislation

+

1.68**
(.58)

Institutional Influences
Legislative Professionalism

-

- 30.61*
(17.95)

Interparty Competition

+

2.83
(6.89)

Difficulty of Voter registration

-

- .17
(.19)

Divided Government

+

22.30***
(1.93)

State Legislative Term Limits

-

- 4.07t
(3.25)

State Government Liberalism

-

- .14**
(.05)

Citizen Ideological Extremism

+

3.27t
(2.17)

% College Grads in State

+

1.03***
(.33)

Traditional Political Culture

-

- 18.23***
(5.54)

Gross State Product-squared

+

7.43e-11***
(1.69e-11)

State Debt Per Capita

-

- .004***
(.001)

Unemployment

-

- .30
(.52)

Ideological Considerations

Demographic Controls

N
Wald Chi2

516.00
246.36***

R2
.46
Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test)
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Table 4 demonstrates that the addition of a single ballot measure to a state’s
biennial ballot moves that state’s governance score up by nearly two points. Several
states such as Oregon and California have frequently had as many as 18 ballot measures
during a single election cycle. This equates to an increase of over 30 points in a state’s
governance score (a scale that maxes out at a total possible value of 200). From a holistic
vantage point, citizen legislating is a significant mover of governance, both statistically (p
< .01) and substantively; a potentially momentous finding that is lost when the
cumulative influence of direct legislation is disregarded in favor of singular or one
dimensional indicators such as state spending.

Institutional Influences
Interestingly, Table 4 shows state legislative professionalism as bearing a strong
negative relationship with state SGGI scores (p < .05). 45 It should be reiterated that the
Squire index ranges from 0 to 1 with decimals in between representing incremental shifts
in professionalism. The variable’s coefficient of -30.61 shows the movement along the
good governance scale when a state goes from being perfectly amateur (Squire index
score = 0) to perfectly professional (Squire index score = 1).
While it would certainly be unsubstantiated to call this significant coefficient for
legislative professionalism an empirical test of Plato’s theory of the philosopher king, it is
nonetheless noteworthy that professionalism is negatively associated with state
governance scores. Indeed, John Locke warns in his Second Treatise of Government that
there is much danger in a legislative body that differentiates itself from its environment
45

Professionalism, moreover, positively correlates on average around r = .4 with a state’s biennial ballot
measure count (Banducci 1998). Given the potential for collinearity, that these variables both maintain their
significance and hypothesized signs is a testament to their robustness.
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(2005 [1690], 78-9). This tendency, Locke argues, increases in direct proportion to the
length of time that a legislative body is “in one lasting assembly” (2005 [1690], 79).
While unable to foresee the politics of electoral campaigns and continuous reelection
efforts, Locke did forewarn that longer lasting legislative assemblies may come to see the
interests of the legislator as distinct from the interests of the citizen. Consequently, it may
produce policy that is not in accordance with the common good (79).
While positively associated with good governance as expected (r = .22), interparty
competition fails to achieve statistical significance in the comprehensive model. 46 This is
not innately problematic. The influence of interparty competition on governance is
concerned with electoral repercussions of a nonresponsive government and with what
that means for party control. Fortunately, much of the theoretical importance of interparty
competition is also contained within the variable of divided government.
Ever controversial, divided government offers an interesting perspective on
governance. Scholars have argued both sides of the aisle. Some assert that divided
government begets gridlock, budget deficits, and minimal legislative productivity (Cox
and Kernell 1991; McCubbins 1991). However, there is also evidence for the flipside.
David Mayhew (1991) and Keith Krehbiel (1998) find little cause for alarm, arguing that
divided government itself is not to blame for gridlock (as supermajorities are frequently
needed to pass substantive legislation anyway) (see also Dodd and Schraufnagel 2008).
Rather, divided government may result in more moderate public policies that are in closer
alignment with the ideology of the public at large (Mayhew 1991; Fiorina 1996; Krehbiel
1998). The findings presented in Table 4 add tentative evidence to this debate. When
46

The difficulty of voter registration, a key explanatory variable of voter turnout, is also rendered
insignificant when the comprehensive model is taken into account. However, the variable retains its
expected negative association with good governance and correlates modestly (r = -.29).
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cumulatively measured against turnout, fiscal health, interest group diversity, and
ideological distance, divided government is associated with significant gains in the
quality of governance. On average, states with divided government rate 22 points higher
than those with unified government on the SGGI (p < .001). While the focal point of this
research is citizen legislation, the divided government consideration adds additional color
to the picture of good governance.
Perhaps an equally contentious variable, state legislative term limits is a
marginally significant institutional influence on governance (p < .10). Scholars debate
whether or not legislative terms limits induce greater government accountability or
substantive representation (Bowman and Kearney 2002; Schraufnagel and Halperin
2006). There is evidence that term limits may actually increase the ideological distance
between a state government and its citizenry, as incoming freshmen legislators may
become more reliant upon interest groups for information and socialization to the
legislative process (Moncrief and Thompson 2001). Moreover, there is evidence to
suggest that the presence of state legislative term limits may serve as a modest depressant
on aggregate state voter turnout (Nalder 2007). In Table 4, term limits is associated with
a 4.07 point drop in a state’s SGGI score, lending some credence to research that has
cautioned against term limits as a quick and easy fix for government accountability
(Moncrief and Thompson 2001; Schraufnagel and Halperin 2006; Nalder 2007).
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Ideological Considerations
Both ideological variables in Table 4 turn up significant relationships to
governance. State government liberalism is strongly associated with lower SGGI values
(p < .01). Simply, liberal governments spend more (Squire 1992; 1993; Bowman and
Kearney 2002; Eckl 2007; Thatcher 2008). This bodes ill for both the year-end reserves
and ideological distance components of the SGGI. Moreover, greater spending may also
translate into larger state agencies and bureaucratic networks marked by incrementalism.
Elaine Sharp (1999, Chs. 3 & 8) warns that policies typified by liberal (as opposed to
moderate or conservative) governments are at increased risk for following a Downsian
sequence. 47 Government liberalism scores range from 0 to 100 (see Berry et al. 1998).
The highest liberalism score that appears in the dataset is 97 and the smallest is 0.
According to this model, movement from the most conservative (0) to most liberal
government score (97) results in a near 14 drop in a state’s SGGI value.
Citizen ideological extremism, on the other hand, is positively associated with
higher quality governance with a marginally significant coefficient of 3.27 (p < .10). On
average, an electorate that is strong in its ideology is also strong in efficacy (Hanson
1980; Iyengar 1980; Hill and Leighley 1993). That is to say, an ideological public tends
to possess the resources needed to be an involved public (Almond and Verba 1989;
Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). Efficacious
electorates may impose greater accountability on the governing process within a state
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These policies include affirmative action and welfare programs run by state agencies (Sharp 1999). The
Downsian sequence is also termed “path dependence” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sharp 1999). The
sequence refers to the process by which a public policy becomes incrementally ingrained in a state’s
administrative landscape that eventually its scope moves out of alignment with public support and
ideology. More importantly, the sequence is not self-correcting. That is, once policy steps outside the zone
of acquiescence, the public is still unable to bring policy back in line (Sharp 1999).
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(Hanson 1980). Indeed, there is modest support for this proposition in Table 4. The
citizen ideological extremism variable is merely the absolute value of a standardized zscore measure for each state’s Citizen Ideology score (see Berry et al. 1998) that ranges
from 0 to 3. The idea is that the conservatism or liberalism of a state population does not
matter to the extent that the degree of the ideology does. As a public becomes more
ideological (as its value moves from 0 to 3), the SGGI score for the state increases by
nearly 10 points.

Demographic Controls
Finally, the results from the four contextual control variables are examined. The
first variable captures how educated a state electorate is. It is the percent of a state
population that has achieved a four year degree or greater. As expected, education is a
highly significant control variable (p < .001). As a state moves from the lowest value that
appears in the data (2.2%) to the greatest (34.6%), the state’s SGGI value climbs nearly
34 points, indicating the necessity of controlling for educational disparities among the
states in studies of governance.
The influence of aggregate state political culture is also telling. Specifically, the
presence of a traditionalistic culture is associated with an 18.23 drop in a state’s SGGI
value (p < .001). Citizenries within traditionalistic cultures, on average, pay less attention
to government, turnout to vote less often, and are not as efficacious as are their nontraditionalistic counterparts (Patterson 1968; Sharkansky 1969; Weissberg 1975; Almond
and Verba 1989). Traditionalistic culture correlates with state education levels (r = .38).
The significance levels of these two variables are a testament to their robustness.
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The final three variables control for disparate economic conditions between the
states. Historic financial conditions exert comparable pressure on the state of governance
as do the more dynamic institutional settings such as citizen legislation or legislative
professionalism. It is particularly important that a state’s GSP-squared be held constant
(Gray and Lowery 1994; 1996). 48 The GSP2 values for each state are measured in the
hundred-billions. Thus, the 7.69e-11 coefficient in Table 4 is substantively miniscule (p <
.001). However, omitting GSP from the model would induce bias into the model given its
strong ties to both interest group diversity and state fiscal health. Related, a state’s debt
per capita is a significant influence (p < .001) on year-end reserves component of the
SGGI (Eckl 2007; Thatcher 2008). Logically, it appears that state’s with greater debt
loads are forced into lower brackets of quality governance by having fewer resources
available for consumption and policy implementation (Gray and Lowery 1996). 49 Lastly,
aggregate state unemployment is held constant. Unemployment has appeared in both the
voter turnout (Jackson 1996; McDonald and Popkin 2001) and state fiscal health
literature (Matsusaka 1995; 2004; 2008; Thatcher 2008). While negatively associated
with a state’s SGGI value, as expected, the variable does not achieve statistical
significance in the comprehensive model (Table 4).
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Gray and Lowery (1994; 1996) instruct that due to the inherently heteroscedastistic nature of gross state
products, the squared values should be employed to achieve the correct functional form.
49
It should be noted that a state’s ballot measure count is statistically unrelated to debt per capita despite
the preponderance of such allegations (Matsusaka 2008).
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Test for Robustness
As a test for robustness, the SGGI is split into its substantive and procedural
dimensions and regressed against the key explanatory variable of citizen legislating,
measured by a state’s biennial ballot measure count. Table 5 contains the output of a
random-effect GLS-regression with robust standard errors for a state’s biennial ballot
measure count and substantive good governance. The substantive component of the SGGI
includes data for year-end reserves and ideological distance between the government and
the citizenry. This smaller index ranges from 2 to 100, where higher values are optimal
for substantive governance. In Table 5, citizen legislation remains a significant
explanatory variable in both simplified regression models. The maximum value for a
biennial ballot measure count that appears in the dataset is 18. As a state moves from
having no initiatives or popular referendums to having the maximum number of measures
(18) on the ballot, the substantive component of the SGGI increases by nearly 15 points.

Table 5: Substantive Good Governance Bivariate Regression, 1980-2000
Variable
Exp. Sign
Coefficient
Citizen Legislation

+

N

.81**
(0.43)
550

Wald Chi2

994.22***

R2

0.02

Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test)

Table 6 contains the results of a similar bivariate regression performed on the
procedural component of the SGGI. As expected, ballot measures remain strongly related
to the procedural dimension of governance, which includes interest group diversity and
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voter turnout. 50 In fact, the degree of citizen legislation that is present within a state
explains just over 7% of the variation in the dependent variable. Within the procedural
dimension (also ranging from 2 to 100), as a state moves from having no direct
legislation to having 18 measures biennially, its procedural score increases over 22
points.

Table 6: Procedural Good Governance Bivariate Regression, 1980-2000
Variable
Citizen Legislation

Exp. Sign

Coefficient

+

1.24***
(0.32)

N

516

Wald Chi2

15.16***

2

R

0.07

Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test)

When governance is viewed comparatively (across similar units) and as a whole,
direct legislation appears to be an asset rather than a liability to a democratic system.
Moreover, this relationship holds even when the SGGI is split into its two theoretical
dimensions, substantive and procedural governance. Tables 5 and 6 are offered as a
validity check for the comprehensive regression model (see Table 4). That is, what holds
in the SGGI model of Table 4 also holds when the model is broken down into its
component parts. Each of the regression analyses contribute to the overall robustness of
the key explanatory variable, citizen legislation. Of all the variables in Table 4, a state’s
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It should be noted that the different N for Table 6 is the result of missing state-level data for interest
group systems. Gray and Lowery (1996) note this in The Population Ecology of Interest Representation but
assert that it does not skew the findings drawn from the data (255-8).
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ballot measure count bears one of the strongest relationships to governance, both
statistically and substantively in terms of the magnitude of the variable’s coefficient.

Citizen Legislating and Good Governance
Table 7 exhibits the state SGGI scores for each decade of analysis. States are
ranked in accordance with their 1980-2000 average values. Over 20 years, Alaska,
Wyoming, and Oregon achieved the highest mean governance values. Alaska and
Wyoming frequently rank in the top five annually for having the most year-end reserves
and highest interest group diversity. Coupled with the relative homogeneity of the two
states, diverse interest group systems engender greater inclusiveness and a more
expansive scope of conflict (Schattschneider 1960). Oregon places annually among the
top three states for having the highest voter turnout and lowest ideological distance.
Among those with the lowest average SGGI scores are South Carolina, Kentucky, and
Pennsylvania. South Carolina and Kentucky have had remarkably low voter turnout,
often with fewer than 33% of the electorate turning out during even year elections, and
high ideological distance between the state government and its citizenries. Pennsylvania
is plagued by low interest group diversity where the ratio of citizen to economic groups is
miniscule. Both the Keystone and Buckeye States 51 are marked by poor fiscal health
which manifests through lower year-end reserves. It is noteworthy that the three states
ranked highest on governance are each active users of the initiative and popular
referendum. In contrast, the bottommost seven states on Table 7 do not actively employ
direct legislation.
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Pennsylvania and South Carolina are commonly called the Keystone State and Buckeye State,
respectively.
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These examples help to elucidate the dynamic and multi-dimensional construct of
governance. For instance, studies that focus solely upon its substantive dimension, fiscal
health for instance, may conclude that State X has low year-end reserves and thus is
poorly governed. Alternately, if the focal point is on voter turnout, scholars may see that
State X has high participation rates and must therefore be governed well. A problem with
such piecemeal approaches is that the multi-faceted construct of governance is
erroneously treated as having only a single dimension. The SGGI is offered as a tentative
first step towards developing a more holistic and theoretically consistent approach in
assessing the desirability of citizen legislation.
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Table 7: Good Governance Rankings by State
State
1980s
1990s
1980-2000
Alaska
149
176
162
Wyoming
156
156
156
Oregon
143
160
152
Montana
154
140
147
Minnesota
125
166
146
North Dakota
161
117
139
Colorado
121
149
135
Maine
133
134
134
Nebraska
131
136
133
Iowa
128
134
131
Idaho
136
125
130
Kansas
133
126
130
New Mexico
126
122
124
South Dakota
132
109
120
Delaware
126
103
115
Rhode Island
111
111
Nevada
109
109
Missouri
113
104
109
Wisconsin
103
110
107
Vermont
114
98
106
Massachusetts
108
102
105
Connecticut
112
97
104
Washington
97
109
103
Mississippi
96
106
101
Mean
California
85
116
100
Louisiana
110
88
99
Alabama
96
96
95
Oklahoma
92
99
Michigan
91
97
94
Illinois
103
84
93
Indiana
87
93
90
Virginia
86
91
89
Florida
67
108
88
Utah
87
87
Ohio
86
85
86
West Virginia
85
85
New Jersey
100
62
81
Texas
85
76
81
North Carolina
84
77
80
Arizona
81
78
80
Hawaii
77
77
Georgia
77
77
77
Arkansas
92
58
75
Tennessee
84
66
75
New York
72
78
75
Maryland
82
67
75
New Hampshire
71
71
71
South Carolina
47
85
66
Kentucky
69
63
66
Pennsylvania
54
54
Poor Governance
Note: A dash denotes missing data in the citizen group component of the index. Where data are
missing, scores are not calculated as this would render a misleadingly lower SGGI score overall.
Good Governance
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Ultimately, what do these results contribute to the theory of governance? Can
good governance be attained achieved when there is citizen lawmaking? If so, what might
this theoretical picture resemble? The findings presented in this study offer tentative
imagery of such a state. Good governance is marked by an efficacious and ideological
electorate that frequently legislates directly under divided government. Government itself
is marked by lower levels of institutionalization and less differentiation from its
environment. Under the banner of representative democracy, governance that strays from
public accountability cannot be good governance. It burgeons when the public is
informed, and more importantly, involved. The results presented here unanimously
indicate that overall, the electorate does seem capable of making beneficial public policy
decisions. And interestingly enough, one of the most helpful roles government can
assume appears to be one of restraint. The findings underlie a contemporary story of
governance as well as strong statistical and theoretical evidence that citizen legislation is
a desirable facet in democratic society. 52

52

See Appendix E for an alternative holistic model that employs the traditional dummy variable capturing
whether or not the initiative process is available in the state. These model findings serve as a validity check
on this study’s primary regression analysis.
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V. CONCLUSION
This study offers a new theoretical construct and an empirical test of questions
surrounding the desirability of citizen lawmaking: Is citizen legislation beneficial to the
governing process? Does direct legislation serve as a quality input into a governing
system? Or, as critics charge, are citizen legislators with their limited knowledge of
government and public policies more of a liability to good governance? It is a classic
question of rule with origins that predate political science as an academic discipline. On
one end of the spectrum are those who argue that lawmakers must be philosopher kings
or at the very least, knowledgeable elites (Plato [360 B.C.E.] 1997; Burke [1770] 1999).
On the opposing side sit those who herald that liberty and equality can only occur under
rule by the people (Rousseau [1762] 1988). Unavoidable in these questions of rule are
questions of the ‘good.’ Whether it is best achieved through rule by elites or average
citizens, the endgame for both camps is the slippery and empirically elusive construct of
good governance.
Good governance is both substantive and procedural (Rousseau [1762] 1988;
Plato [360 B.C.E.] 1997; Habermas 1998; Dahl 2005; Rawls 2005). It is a process (see
Figure 4) that produces beneficial public policies and a healthy state of the union (Easton
1971), as well as public inclusiveness through a constant expansion of the scope of
conflict (Schattschneider 1960). As noted earlier, good governance may be more readily
identifiable by its symptoms than its theoretical essence. Consequently this study
proposed four indicators of governance, two representing its substantive dimension
(Rawls 2005) and two from its procedural component (Warren 1993; Habermas 1998).
Taken together, these four variables comprise empirical indicators of both substantive
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and procedural governance. Moreover, when the fifty states are ranked biennially on
voter turnout, year-end reserves, interest group diversity, ideological distance between
the government and its citizenry, their rankings can be combined together to form a
multi-dimensional index of good governance. The values of the index allow us to discern
whether citizen legislating produces a progressive or degenerative association with the
equilibrium of a political system (Lakatos 1970, 48-52; Easton 1971, 268-74). Figure 4
below outlines the systems theory approach to governance.

Governance

Inputs

Outputs

(Citizen

(Public
Policies)

Legislation)

Political System

Political Environment

Figure 4: Systems Theory Model of Governance

As evidenced by Figure 4, good governance is the process by which outputs from
the political system influence the political environment to produce quality inputs into the
system. Each cycle moves the process forward towards a continuously improving slate of
inputs and demands, or at the very least a “non-degenerative equilibrium” (Easton 1971,
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268-72). The central question at hand, the degree to which citizen legislating is associated
with good governance, is ultimately an inquiry as to whether citizen rule serves as a
positive or negative demand on the political system. The findings of this study indicate
that direct democracy is both a significant and beneficial input into the governing
process. Controlling for factors such as legislative professionalism, divided government,
state legislative term limits, government liberalism, citizen ideological extremism, state
education levels, political culture, gross state product, state debt per capita, and state
unemployment rates, direct legislation has both a significant and positive association with
indicators of good governance. This finding holds when the operationalization of citizen
legislation is changed from the preferred ballot measure count to the more traditionally
employed dummy variable capturing whether the initiative process is available in a state.
In all, the relationship is robust and holds up throughout all model specifications. 53
These finding are not suggesting that the public should act as the sole source of
new legislation in the American states. Rather, these results strongly indicate that among
the myriad of inputs and demands placed upon a political system, citizen legislation is
makes a quality contribution to the governing process. Indeed, there is both theoretical
and empirical evidence to suggest that when citizens operate as legislators, the very act of
legislating directly is transformative, improving the electorate’s sense of efficacy as well
as its understanding of both public policy and its own role in government (Lupia 1994;
Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004; Matsusaka 2004; Smith
and Tolbert 2004; 2007).
53

See Appendix E for the results from a random-effects GLS regression that substitutes a dummy variable
for ballot measure count. The initiative state dummy variable remains significant and positively associated
with state SGGI scores. However, the relationship is weaker likely due to the muted effect of the dummy
variable on the substantive component of governance; as institutional presence of the initiative or popular
referendum does not guarantee use.

62

It is important to note, the contribution of direct democracy to the overall
governing process may outweigh any single benefit associated with a particular ballot
measure’s public policy mandate. Most recently, state initiatives banning gay marriage
during the 2008 general election have been deemed discriminatory and bigoted by
minority activists (Yi 2008, A1). Critics argue that this is simply the latest installation of
detrimental public policy to emerge from the initiative process (Yi 2008, A1); that citizen
legislating cannot possibly be ‘good’ for governance when it produces such adverse
public policies (Ellis 2002, Chs. 4-5). In this instance, a strictly linear examination of
Point A (initiatives as input) to Point B (marriage bans as output) may support this
conclusion. However, it is imperative to consider the influences of citizen legislation on
the process of governance as a whole.
Following the passage of a marriage protection amendment in the state of Florida
(Amendment 2) newly formed gay rights groups registered as active lobbying forces in
Tallahassee during the succeeding workweek (Associated Press 2008). Amendment 2,
though arguably a discriminatory policy in and of itself, effectively expanded the scope
of conflict, spawning the formation of additional citizen groups, which served to further
diversify the state’s interest group population, thus improving representativeness.
Citizens began writing letters to their member of Congress, governors, and state
legislators, protesting the measure, becoming informed, publicly discussing the
implications of the policy (Associated Press 2008). In short, the measure has people
talking. Comparable indirect effects have also followed the passage of English-only
amendments (Schildkraut 2001) and Indian gaming laws (Boehmke et al. 2006). Ballot
measures frequently induce greater issue awareness and stimulate informed public
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participation that reshapes the political environment over time (Tolbert, McNeal, and
Smith 2003, 23; Matsusaka 2004, Ch. 7).
It is precisely this influence on the political environment that scholars have
referred to as the “educative effect” of citizen legislation (Howe 1915; Smith and Tolbert
2004; 2006; 2007). The findings presented here join the host of extant literature, offering
a resounding ‘yes’ to a longstanding question of political science; do citizen legislators
move us closer to a state of good governance?
The beneficial contributions of direct democracy often go unseen; particularly,
when we limit the focus of our studies to singular government outputs (see Figure 4).
However, when we pan back to examine the influences of direct legislation on the
governing process, it emerges as a quality input into the political system, an asset rather
than a liability. When citizens act in the capacity of legislators, “it can lead to constant
discussion, to a deeper interest in government, and to a psychological conviction that a
government is in effect the people themselves. And perhaps this is the greatest gain of
all” (Howe 1915; Smith and Tolbert 2006, 36). This study serves as additional evidence
in support of the contributions made by direct legislation and for the citizens that have
taken the initiative on the road to good governance.
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APPENDIX A: VOTER TURNOUT MODEL
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Voter turnout remains one of the most heavily studied topics in political science.
Many of the studies construct elaborate empirical models with a multitude of explanatory
variables. However, there are five independent variables that stand out as the core of most
studies: educational attainment of the electorate, difficulty of voter registration, state
unemployment rate, political culture, and interparty competition. Table 8 outlines the
regression output for voter turnout. 54
Higher educational attainment within a state is strongly associated with greater
political participation, including turning out to vote (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003).
Table 8 demonstrates that as the percent of a state’s residents that have a bachelor’s
degree or higher increases, voter turnout rises as well, and is significant at p < .001. As a
state moves from the minimum educational attainment value that appears in the data
(2.2%) to the maximum value (35%) turnout increases by nearly ten percentage points.
Moreover, as citizen face greater difficulty in registering to vote, they are less
likely to turnout come election day regardless of educational attainment (Jackson 1996).
Difficulty of voter registration is popularly operationalized by the number of days before
an election in which registration closes (Jackson 1996). Table 8 evidences a strong
negative relationship between difficulty of voter registration and voter turnout (p < .01).
Difficulty of voter registration also has the capacity to lower turnout by ten percentage
points over the course of its full range of values that appear in the dataset.
Unemployment rates for each of the states are acquired from the State Politics and
Policy Data Center. 55 Unemployment is measured as the percent of a state’s total
employment pool that is currently out of work (State Politics and Policy Data Center
54

It is noteworthy that each of the variables in the appendices are operationalized and measured identically
in the appendices are they are in the research design.
55
Data is available at the SPPQ website: http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/links.shtml.
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2008). It is expected that greater unemployment is typically indicative of poor economic
conditions at the state and local level. In times of economic trouble or uncertainty, voter
turnout has been known to increase as the electorate rallies with renewed political interest
in government policy (Arceneaux 2003). Table 8 offers support for such a relationship (p
< .01).
Political culture is also thought to weigh heavily on voter turnout (Elazar 1966;
Hanson 1980). Specifically, Daniel Elazar’s (1966) conceptualization of a “traditionalist”
culture is a pertinent control. Traditionalist cultures congregate disproportionately in the
south and are typically marked by less efficacious electorates that turnout to vote less
frequently than the national average (Elazar 1966; Sharkansky 1969; Johnson 1976;
Layman and Carmines 1997). Therefore, there is strong reason to expect lower voter
turnout among these states than with the non-traditionalist counterpart (Johnson 1976).
Indeed, a state that may be classified as having a traditionalistic political culture has, on
average, nearly eight percentage points lower voter turnout than a nontraditionalistic
state.
Finally, interparty competition is also thought to be a theoretically important
mover of voter turnout (King 1994; Jackson 1996; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003).
Interparty competition is ultimately an issue of mobilization. Consequently, its positive
coefficient in Table 8 is consistent with the literature. However, given the simplified
operationalization of the variable, its significance may be muted. 56
The following model is run:

56

The sophisticated measurement of choice, the Major Party Index (Ceasar and Saldin 2005) is not
available for the 1980s. Moreover, the Ranney index is calculated to include a measure of party
competition over time. Thus, this traditional index would not have allowed for much variation within the
variable as it is available on a per decade basis.
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Voter Turnout = (Constant) + b1 (State Education Level)
- b2 (Difficulty of Voter Registration) + b3 (State Unemployment)
- b4 (Traditionalist Political Culture) + b5 (Interparty Competition)+ et

Table 8: Voter Turnout Simplified Regression, 1980-2000
Variables

Exp. Sign

Model

Percent Pop. College Graduates

+

.003***
(.001)

Difficulty of Voter Registration

-

.002**
(.001)

+

.005**
(.002)

-

-.074***
(-0.014)

+

.01
(.02)

Unemployment Rate

Traditionalist Political Culture

Interparty Competition

N
Wald Chi2

550
8226.70***

R2

.25

Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10
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APPENDIX B: YEAR-END RESERVES MODEL
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A state’s fiscal health is the result of a myriad of social, political, and economic
conditions in any particular year. However, a simplified theoretical model posits that
year-end reserves are a function of government liberalism, state debt per capita, state
unemployment, and legislative professionalism.
Government liberalism is operationalized by the Government Ideology Index (see
Berry et al. 1998), which ranges from 0, indicating conservatism to 100 which represents
liberalism. The index is constructed by weighting the policy stances and subsequent
interest group ratings of each state’s major parties and congressional candidates.
Logically, it is expected that more liberal governments tend to spend more (Berry et al.
1998). Consequently, there will likely be fewer year-end reserves among these states.
Furthermore, it is proposed that greater state debt per capita will also play a role
in reducing year-end reserves. On the surface it would seem that states bearing greater
debt would apportion more annual revenue to paying down its indebtedness. However, as
a control variable for year-end reserves, as a state’s debt load increases during the year, it
represents reserves that are not being used to pay down debt. Thus, the positive albeit
insignificant relationship in Table 9 is expected.
Regarding state unemployment, it is expected that higher state unemployment will
engender either increased government spending or reduced revenue. Consequently,
government may opt to compensate those disadvantaged by the economic downturn or to
provide tax relief to individual home or business owners during times of high
unemployment. Table 9 outlines this relationship. Year-end reserves tend to fall
significantly (p < .001) as unemployment within a state rises.
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State legislative professionalism is expected to negatively influence year-end
reserves. While, more professionalized legislatures are not necessarily more liberal, they
do tend to spend more funds annually on public policies, specifically greater welfare
spending (Squire 1992; 1993; Banducci 1998; King 2000; Maestas 2000; Bowman and
Kearney 2002). Indeed, as a state’s Squire index value moves from 0 to 1, year-end
reserves fall significantly (p < .001).
The following regression analysis is run:
Year-end Reserves = (Constant) – b1 (Government Liberalism)
- b2 (State Debt Per Capita) - b3 (State Unemployment Rate)
- b4 (State Legislative Professionalism)

Table 9: Year-end Reserves Simplified Regression, 1980-2000
Variables

Exp. Sign

Model

Government Liberalism

-

- .01
(.01)

State Debt Per Capita

+

.001
(.001)

Unemployment Rate

-

- 1.29***
(.17)

State Legislative Professionalism

-

- 14.95***
(3.94)

N

550

Wald Chi2

165.01***

R2

.13

Cell entries are random effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10
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APPENDIX C: STATE INTEREST GROUP DIVERSITY MODEL
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The diversity of a state’s interest group population is linked to the notion of more
expansive interest representation. With a noted class bias in political participation, having
a more diverse array of hands vying for public policies marks a step towards better
governance (Schattschneider 1960; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). The category of
citizen groups is inherently miscellaneous (Geber 1999; Braunstein 2002; Boehmke
2002; 2005a). Citizen groups may represent moral issues, law enforcement, taxation,
education, or environmental concerns. Consequently, as citizen groups become a larger
proportion of a state’s interest group population, it may be said that the interest group
system is diversifying.
Within the simplified model in Table 10, two explanatory and two control
variables are regressed against the percent of a state’s interest group system that is
comprised of active citizen groups. The first factor considered is gross state product
squared (Gray and Lowery 1994; 1996). While the dependent variable in this model is
calculated from the raw data of total citizen groups active within a state, the two must be
differentiated. Interest group diversity is a gauge of how balanced a state’s interest group
system is between economic and citizen representation (Boehmke 2005a). However, the
ESA model of interest group density necessitates a control for state “energy” (Gray and
Lowery 1996). Energy is represented by gross state product squared. Without the
resources needed to sustain interest groups within a state, both economic and citizen
group numbers will decline. The positive and significant coefficient in Table 10 supports
the findings of Gray and Lowery (1994; 1996).
A second control variable is whether or not a state may be classified as having a
traditionalistic political culture (Elazar 1966). Such states have electorates that are, on
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average, less involved or aware of politics and public policies (Elazar 1966; Sharkansky
1969). From this one may expect a less expansive scope of conflict and interest
representation among states with traditionalistic political cultures. While the regression
output in Table 10 outlines a negative association between traditionalistic political culture
and state interest group diversity, the relationship is not statistically significant.
As single party control of the state legislative and governorship gives way to
divided government, it is likely that a more expansive slate of interests will make the
political agenda (Downs 1957; Mayhew 1991). Consequently, within states with divided
government there may simply be less need for outside mobilization strategies such as
citizen group formation, as government may represent a more diverse array of issues and
concerns under divided government. The significant negative coefficient in Table 10
provides support for this hypothesis.
Finally, states with ideologically extreme electorates will likely have more diverse
interest group systems as a function of greater activism within the state (Rosenstone and
Hansen 2003). That is, coherent and extreme ideology is associated with more political
activity on average. Ideological citizenries are efficacious and active in the political
system. The significant and positive coefficient for citizen ideological extremism in Table
10 supports this claim. An increase of one standard deviation in a citizenry’s ideological
extremism is associated with a two percentage point increase in the diversity of the state’s
active interest group system. The following model is run:
State Interest Group Diversity = (constant) + b1 (Gross State Product)
- b2 (Divided Government) – b3 (Traditionalist Culture)
+ b4 (Citizen Ideological Extremism)
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Table 10: State Interest Group Diversity Simplified Regression, 1980-2000
Variables

Exp. Sign

Model

Gross State Product Squared

+

4.14e-13***
(5.53e-14)

Traditionalist Political Culture

-

- .01
(.006)

Divided Government

-

- .01*
(.00)

Citizen Ideological Extremism

+

.02***
(.005)

N
Wald Chi2

515
176.09***

R2

.20

Cell entries are random effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10
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APPENDIX D: GOVERNMENT-CITIZEN IDEOLOGICAL
DISTANCE MODEL
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In representative democracies, the issue of substantive representation remains at
the forefront of political research. That is, the ideology of the electorate and its entailing
policy concerns should generally be reflected in its elected representatives (Burke [1770]
1999). 57 Thus, ideological distance between the government and its citizen should be
minimal. Greater ideological distance is seen as detrimental even for Burkean-trustee
adherents. Elites are still able to craft policy in accordance with their expertise, provided
it is comparable to the broader ideological values of those who elect them.
Representatives with an ideology that is radically divergent from their constituencies runs
counter to the idea of representative democracy.
States with professionalized legislatures should have, on average, less ideological
distance between the government and the citizenry. Legislative professionalism entails
increased government capacity and is linked to the fostering of constituency services
(Hibbing 1986; Fiorina 1989; 1999; Maestas 2000; Bowman and Kearney 2002; Squire
2007). Overall, professionalized legislative bodies are more attentive and in tune with
their constituencies out of the desire for re-election or progressive ambition (Maestas
2000; Squire 2007). Table 11 show a significant (p < .05) and negative relationship the
dependent variable and legislative professionalism. A movement from 0 to 1, that is from
an amateur to professional legislative body, lowers the average ideological distance value
by over 10 points.
Studies to date have found that state legislative term limits may actually
exacerbate the problem of ideological distance (Moncrief and Thompson 2001; Bowman

57

It should be noted that this does not entail representatives following in lock-step with public opinion;
only that the broader ideology of their constituency is effectively represented. In this way, the desired
minimal ideological distance between government and the citizenry holds for both the delegate and trustee
models of representation.
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and Kearney 2002; Schraufnagel and Halperin 2006). Term limits may in fact proffer the
power of interest groups who understand the workings of a political system better than
the incoming freshman legislators, who must rely upon these groups for information and
contacts (Moncrief and Thompson 2001). The positive and significant coefficient in
Table 11 evidences a modest relationship between term limits and ideological distance
between the government and its citizenry.
Another key variable to be included is citizen ideological extremism. An
ideological electorate is also one that is more likely to keep government in line with its
own ideology (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). Table 11 outlines that as a citizenry moves
up one standard deviation in ideological extremism, the state’s ideological distance score
falls by nearly 5 points (p < .001). The idea behind citizen ideological extremism is that a
more active and aware electorate is more likely to keep its representative system
representative.
Finally, political culture is controlled. Evidence suggests that government
responsiveness and representativeness may also be a feature of whether or not a state’s
culture is traditionalistic (Elazar 1966; Sharkansky 1969). These states possess
electorates that are, on average, less informed and less involved in the political process
(Elazar 1966). Therefore, there is simply less likelihood that ideological distance will be
punished or corrected during elections. The following regression analysis is run:

Ideological Distance = (constant) – b1 (State Legislative Professionalism)
+ b2 (Term Limits) – b3 (Citizen Ideol. Extremism)
- b4 (Traditionalist Political Culture)
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Table 11: Government-Citizen Ideological Dist. Simplified Regression, 1980-2000
Variables

Exp. Sign

Model

State Legislative Professionalism

-

- 10.43*
(4.74)

State Legislative Term Limits

+

4.00**
(1.31)

Citizen Ideol. Extremism

-

- 4.53***
(.77)

Traditionalist Political Culture

+

.70
(1.38)

N
Wald Chi

550
2

521.43***

R2

.09

Cell entries are random effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10
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APPENDIX E: ALTERNATE GOOD GOVERNANCE MODEL
(Dummy Variable Regression)

80

Traditional models of direct legislation employ a dummy variable as the key
explanatory variable, capturing whether or not the initiative process is available in a
particular state (Tatalovich 1995; Gerber 1996a; 1996b; Tolbert and Hero 1998; Zavodny
2000; Schildkraut 2001; Boehmke 2005a; 2005b). While this provides for a clean
empirical test, it may muffle the true explanatory weight of citizen legislation on two
accounts. First, operationalizing direct legislation as a dummy variable will likely mute
the potential effects upon the substantive component of good governance. Institutional
availability of the initiative does not necessarily entail use. Consequently, a state may be
coded 1 for having the process and yet its biennial ballot measure count may be zero.
With no actual measures on the ballot, the substantive influences are not picked up by the
model. Second, the dummy variable typically does not include popular referendums.
Until recently, the Initiative and Referendum Institute collected data only on citizen
initiatives. Historically, the initiative process has been the main focus of direct legislation
research; and rightly so, as most ballot measures in the states are in initiatives. However,
ignoring popular referendums, which are by definition citizen initiated statutory reform,
may also distort empirical models. Simply put, when discussing citizen legislation, all
citizen initiated legislation must be considered.
As a validity check on this study’s holistic governance model, the effort is made
to substitute this traditional dummy variable for the ballot measure count. Table 12
contains the GLS-regression output for the alternative model. No variables have been
changed except for the key explanatory variable (biennial ballot measure count).
Reassuringly, none of the variables change signs, and few change significance levels. The
R-squared value remains constant, and statistically, nothing is lost.
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Table 12: Good Governance Dummy Regression, 1980-2000
Variables

Expected Sign

Model

Key Explanatory
Initiative available in state?

+

13.84**
(5.09)

Institutional Influences
Legislative Professionalism

-

- 32.56**
(18.02)

Interparty Competition

+

3.73
(6.89)

Difficulty of Voter registration

-

- .19
(.19)

Divided Government

+

22.67***
(1.91)

State Legislative Term Limits

-

- 3.08
(3.12)

State Government Liberalism

-

- .13**
(.05)

Citizen Ideological Extremism

+

3.38*
(2.17)

% College Grads in State

+

1.17***
(.34)

Traditional Political Culture

-

- 16.75**
(5.59)

Gross State Product-squared

+

7.92e-11***
(1.57e-11)

State Debt Per Capita

-

- .01***
(.001)

Unemployment

-

- .19
(.51)
516.00
241.87***

Ideological Considerations

Demographic Controls

N
Wald Chi2

R2
.46
Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test)
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Thus, when considered holistically, citizen legislation is a positive and significant
influence upon a state’s SGGI score regardless of operationalization. This is another
reminder of the importance of considering governance as a whole. When examined
piecemeal, findings are fickle and models tend to lack robustness as has been the case in
much of the direct legislation literature to date. This may at least partly explain the
conflicting assertions of initiative scholars (see Matsusaka 1995; Gerber 1996b; Lascher,
Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001). 58
The traditional initiative dummy variable only becomes problematic once the
SGGI is broken into its two theoretical components. Tables 13 and 14 outline bivariate
regression output for procedural and substantive good governance. The dummy variable
is substituted for the ballot measure count operationalization. Table 13 evidences that the
availability of the initiative process alone appears to improve inclusiveness and
procedural governance. Boehmke (2005a) and Gerber (1999) suggest that the institutional
presence of the initiative is enough to induce the formation of citizen groups and efficacy
within the electorate. Simply knowing the option for direct legislation is available,
appears to benefit procedural governance.

58

Michael Hagen, Edward Lascher, John Camobreco, and Steven Rochlin (2001) authored a series of
articles that disputed the findings of John G. Matsusaka (1995; 2001; 2004) and Elisabeth Gerber (1996b)
on both the financial effects of direct legislation as well as its relationship to public opinion and
governmental responsiveness. Because such conflictual results exist, subsequent authors have tended to cite
the team whose evidence supports their research agendas.
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Table 13: Procedural Good Governance, Bivar. Dummy Regression, 1980-2000
Variable
Initiative available in state?

Exp. Sign
+

Coefficient
15.29**
(5.36)
516
8.14**
0.11

N
Wald Chi2
R2

Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test)

However, as predicted, the influence of citizen legislation is effectively mute on
the substantive component of the SGGI. Table 14 contains the bivariate regression output
for substantive good governance. The coefficient (2.39) is small in magnitude and
statistically insignificant (p < .24). Because there is no guarantee that actual measures are
making it to the ballot every two years, the initiative dummy variable acts as a poor
explanatory variable in this instance.

Table 14: Substantive Good Governance, Bivar. Dummy Regression, 1980-2000
Variable
Initiative available in state?

Exp. Sign

Coefficient

+

2.39
(3.30)
550
974.59***
0.01

N
Wald Chi2
R2

Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test)

These auxiliary regression analyses demonstrate the robustness of this study’s
main holistic model and key explanatory variable (Table 4). Citizen legislation does
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appear to be positively and significantly associated with quality governance, even when
the index is split into its two theoretical parts. However, when the traditional dummy
variable is employed rather than a biennial ballot measure count, its effect upon the
substantive component of the SGGI is muffled. Notably, when governance is considered
as a whole, either KEV operationalization holds its significant and positive association
with the dependent variable. This offers support for both the use of a state’s ballot
measure count as key explanatory variable, and emphasizes the empirical importance of a
more holistic conception of governance.
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